"Meltdown" - Tom Woods explica a crise

Meltdown’ Blames Feds for the Crashby Declan McCullagh (CBS) Not only is our current recession unusually deep and severe, but it’s about to become the longest since the Great Depression. Housing prices are crashing, stocks have fallen into a deep bear market, and the only things up besides unemployment are the sale of ammunition and AR-15 rifles. Figuring out how we’ve reached this point is not easy. One choice is to blame laissez-faire policies, an argument that’s been invoked by everyone from notoriously pessimistic economist Nouriel Roubini and reporters at the New York Times to French President Nicolas Sarkozy. On the other hand, the number of pages of federal regulations has swelled, not shrunk, over the last decade. The number of employees at the relevant agencies (SEC, FDIC, FINRA, OCC, NCUA, FFIEC, OTS, FHRA, and the FRB) has continued to grow. It was regulatory failure, not market failure, that gave us the spectacles of Darrel Dochow, Bernie Madoff, and taxpayer-funded bonuses at AIG. Another explanation is that unfettered greed, especially on the part of Wall Street and mortgage lenders, is the culprit. But human greed and avarice are not unique to the last decade, when housing prices skyrocketed beyond what fundamentals permit, making that explanation less satisfying than it should be. A new book by Thomas Woods called Meltdown (Regnery Publishing, 2009) provides a more fulfilling account of what went wrong, why it happened, and who’s to blame. Woods holds a doctorate in history from Columbia University and is the author of the bestselling, iconoclastic The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Woods’ latest book makes a strong argument for laying the blame squarely on the shoulders of Washington politicians and regulators. One chapter is titled “How Government Created the Housing Bubble,” and points to special privileges granted to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a federal law allowing tax-free capital gains, and the Community Reinvestment Act’s incentives for banks to make bad loans. The ultimate culprit, in Woods’ view, is the Federal Reserve. In 2001, he writes, “Fed chairman Alan Greenspan sought to reignite the economy through a series of rate cuts… the new money and credit overwhelmingly found its way into the housing market, where artificially lax lending standards made excessive home purchases and speculation in homes seem to many Americans like good financial moves.” This is not a unique criticism. Many economists, including Stanford University’s John Taylor, have charged that the Federal Reserve kept interest rates artificially low and that the housing boom and bust could have been avoided with more prudent government policies. At a congressional hearing last fall, some Democratic politicians made similar allegations. (For his part, former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan responded in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article last week titled “The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble.”) Woods is a senior fellow at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Ala., a non-profit group devoted to libertarian scholarship and championing what’s known as Austrian business cycle theory. The idea is that a central bank’s low interest rates expand the money supply, therefore creating malinvestments (because, say, real estate or dot-com entrepreneurs believe there’s immense demand for what they have to offer), an unsustainable boom, and an eventual correction. Nobel laureate F.A. Hayek, a leading proponent of that theory, was a founding board member of the institute. The Austrian explanation remains a minority one among economists — Times columnist Paul Krugman likened it to the “phlogiston theory of fire,” and the late Milton Friedman claimed it has done “a great deal of harm.” Woods’ solutions to today’s economic woes are the opposite of the U.S. government’s (or Krugman’s) approach: he would let firms go bankrupt, ditch Fannie and Freddie, halt bailouts, and question whether the Federal Reserve even needs to exist. Woods says Austrian theory is worth studying because it correctly predicted what’s happening today. “It’s about time we listened instead to people who have a coherent theory to explain why these crises occur, saw this crisis coming, and have something to suggest other than juvenile fantasies about spending and inflating our way to prosperity,” he writes, perhaps a little too optimistically given the current political climate in Washington. Woods’ work — the complete title is Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse — is in the vanguard of the first wave of books dissecting the Crash of 2008. (Rep. Ron Paul, the Texas Republican and former presidential candidate, said in a foreword that “there is no better book to read on the present crisis than this one.”) See Full text Go to Tom Woods’ website

EU - trilhões de dólares deficits orçamentais por anos

WASHINGTON – President Barack Obama's budget would generate deficits averaging almost $1 trillion a year over the next decade, according to the latest congressional estimates, significantly worse than predicted by the White House just last month. The Congressional Budget Office figures, obtained by The Associated Press Friday, predict Obama's budget will produce $9.3 trillion worth of red ink over 2010-2019. That's $2.3 trillion worse than the White House predicted in its budget. Worst of all, CBO says the deficit under Obama's policies would never go below 4 percent of the size of the economy, figures that economists agree are unsustainable. By the end of the decade, the deficit would exceed 5 percent of gross domestic product, a dangerously high level. --- http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090320/ap_on_go_pr_wh/obama_budget

A bolsa americana vista de Europa

O Índice Standard & Poor's 500 deflacionado por o índice de preço e corrigido por a taxa de câmbio do dólar (em relação do marco alemão e desde 1999 do Euro).

Resultado: Em Fevereiro 2009 o valor do índice voltou por o mesmo nível como em Junho de 1964.

A Ponzi economia dos Estados Unidos

Nouriel Roubini: The United States Of Ponzi "... A reporter contacted me recently with the following question: "I am a reporter, and I am doing a story on Bernard Madoff's life after pleading guilty. As part of this, I was wondering if you could comment on what significance he will have in the history of this period. Will he represent more than a scamster who stole a lot of money from a lot of people? As Bernie Ebbers and Ken Lay came to embody corporate greed and deceit, what will Madoff symbolize?" Here is my answer fleshed out in full: Americans lived in a "Made-off" and Ponzi bubble economy for a decade or even longer. Madoff is the mirror of the American economy and of its over-leveraged agents: a house of cards of leverage over leverage by households, financial firms and corporations that has now collapsed in a heap. When you put zero down on your home, and you thus have no equity in your home, your leverage is literally infinite and you are playing a Ponzi game. And the bank that lent you, with zero down, a NINJA (no income, no jobs and assets) liar loan that was interest-only for a while, with negative amortization and an initial teaser rate, was also playing a Ponzi game. And private equity firms that did over a $1 trillion of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the last few years with a debt-to-earnings ratio of 10 or above were also Ponzi firms playing a Ponzi game. A government that will issue trillions of dollars of new debt to pay for this severe recession and socialize private losses may risk becoming a Ponzi government if--in the medium term--it does not return to fiscal discipline and debt sustainability. A country that has--for over 25 years--spent more than income and thus run an endless string of current account deficit--and has thus become the largest net foreign debtor in the world (with net foreign liabilities that are likely to be over $3 trillion by the end of this year)--is also a Ponzi country that may eventually default on its foreign debt if it does not, over time, tighten its belt and start running smaller current account deficits and actual trade surpluses. Whenever you persistently consume more than your income year after year (a household with negative savings, a government with budget deficit, a firm or financial institution with persistent losses, a country with a current account deficit) you are playing a Ponzi game. In the jargon of formal economics, you are not satisfying your long-run inter-temporal budget constraint as you borrow to finance the interest rate on your previous debt, and are thus following an unsustainable debt dynamics that eventually leads to outright insolvency..." Texto completo: http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/18/american-economy-housing-bubble-madoff-opinions-columnists-ponzi_print.html

Fim do papel do dólar como moeda de reserva global

LUXEMBOURG (Reuters) - A U.N. panel will next week recommend that the world ditch the dollar as its reserve currency in favor of a shared basket of currencies, a member of the panel said on Wednesday, adding to pressure on the dollar...-- http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52H2CY20090318

A origem da crise

Os autores do segunte artigo analisam o papel da teoria de gestão como causa da crise e negam que boni e "shareholder value" sejam culpables: "... Is management theory to blame for the current crisis in the world economy? Some commentators think that business schools' focus on shareholder wealth maximization, performance-based pay, and the virtue of self-interest have led banks, corporations, and governments astray. Hefty bonuses promoted excessive risk-taking, and the free-market philosophy taught in business schools removed the final ethical checks and balances on such behavior. "It is the type of thinking," worry Raymond Fisman and Rakesh Khurana in Forbes (December 12, 2008), "that is now bringing capitalism to its knees..." Leia mais:

O que acontece sem bailouts do governo?

NEW YORK (AP) -- What if the government got out of the bailout business?

Análise Macroeconômica III - EMENTA

303154 – Análise Macroeconômica III CR: 04 c.H. 60 P.E.L. 4.00.0 Pré-Requisito: 303155 EMENTA: Teorias do crescimento econômico. Crises econômicas, monetárias e financeiras. Política fiscal e monetária e suas limitações. Análise de problemas macroeconômicas da atualidade. Debates da macroeconomia. AVALIAÇÂO: Três provas (Abril, Maio, Junho), um trabalho (3-5 pp.), participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas. METODO: 1. Método: expositivo-dialógico 2. Procedimentos didáticos: - Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula - Apresentação de trabalhos de pesquisa e reflexão - Exercícios analíticos - Leituras reflexivas - Analise de exemplos - Discussão de temas de atualidade BIBLIOGRAFIA Livro de texto padrão: Olivier Blanchard: Macroeconomia. Pearson Education do Brasil. 4ª edição 2007 Cap.: 10-13; 22-23; 24-27 N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomia. Editora LTC. 1998 SITE: http://www.economianova.blogspot.com/ BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR: 1. Textos básicos Ackley, Gardner( 1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira, Vol 1, cap. I e II. Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 1, 2 e 30. Byrns, Ralph T. & Stone, Gerald W(1 995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron Books. cap. 1 a 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hjll cap. 1 e 18. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 1 e 2. Lima, Gilberto Tadeu(1 992).Em Busca do Tempo Perdido: A Recuperação Pós - Keynesiana da Economia do Emprego de Keynes. Rio de Janeiro, BNDES, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas. Vol. 1, cap. 1 e 7.. Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P( 1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 1 a 3. 2. Fundamentos da Macroeconomia Clássica e Keynesiana Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira. cap. V. Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 e 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 2. Leite, José Alfredo A( 1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 2. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 18 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 3. Modelos de Equilíbrio Agregativo de Curto Prazo Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira.cap. XXIII a XV. Blanchard, Olivier(1999 )Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 a 6. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron, cap. 3 a 5 e 10 a 12 Gordon, Robert J(1 990),Macroeconomics. Illinois,Scott,Foresman and Company, cap. 3 a 5. Sachs, Jefrey D. & Larrain, B.Felipe(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro,Makron Books, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976)Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 19 e 20 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 6 a 8. 4. Expectativas e o Modelo Macroeconômico da IS -LM Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 7 a 10. Davidson, Paul(1994).Post-Keynesian Macroeconomic. Cambridge, Edward Elgar. cap. 8 e 12. 5. Modelo Keynesiano Generalizado Numa Economia Aberta Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 6 e 20. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 9 e 11. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 13. Símonsen, Mario H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 8. 6. Oferta Agregada e Mercado de Trabalho Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 13. Leite, José Alfredo A(1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 11 e 12. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 11. 7.Equilíbrio Geral de Todos os Mercados AgregadosBlanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 7. 8. Produto, Inflação e Desemprego Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 14 a 17. CONHECIMENTOS PREREQUISITOS Modelos 1. Cruz keynesiana 2. ISLM 3. Curva de Phillips 4. Curva de Phillips com expectativas 5. ISLMBP 6. Modelo monetarista 7. Expectativas racionais 8. Oferta e demanda agregada 9. Modelo de metas da inflação (Taylor rule) 10. Contabilidade social 11. Contabilidade de crescimento (growth accounting)

Macro III Bibliografia complementar

BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR: 1. Textos básicos Ackley, Gardner( 1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira, Vol 1, cap. I e II. Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 1, 2 e 30. Byrns, Ralph T. & Stone, Gerald W(1 995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron Books. cap. 1 a 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hjll cap. 1 e 18. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 1 e 2. Lima, Gilberto Tadeu(1 992).Em Busca do Tempo Perdido: A Recuperação Pós - Keynesiana da Economia do Emprego de Keynes. Rio de Janeiro, BNDES, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas. Vol. 1, cap. 1 e 7.. Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P( 1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 1 a 3. 2. Fundamentos da Macroeconomia Clássica e Keynesiana Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira. cap. V. Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 e 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 2. Leite, José Alfredo A( 1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 2. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 18 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 3. Modelos de Equilíbrio Agregativo de Curto Prazo Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira.cap. XXIII a XV. Blanchard, Olivier(1999 )Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 a 6. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron, cap. 3 a 5 e 10 a 12 Gordon, Robert J(1 990),Macroeconomics. Illinois,Scott,Foresman and Company, cap. 3 a 5. Sachs, Jefrey D. & Larrain, B.Felipe(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro,Makron Books, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976)Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 19 e 20 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 6 a 8. 4. Expectativas e o Modelo Macroeconômico da IS -LM Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 7 a 10. Davidson, Paul(1994).Post-Keynesian Macroeconomic. Cambridge, Edward Elgar. cap. 8 e 12. 5. Modelo Keynesiano Generalizado Numa Economia Aberta Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 6 e 20. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 9 e 11. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 13. Símonse, Mario H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 8. 6. Oferta Agregada e Mercado de Trabalho Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 13. Leite, José Alfredo A(1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 11 e 12. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 11. 7.Equilíbrio Geral de Todos os Mercados AgregadosBlanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 7. 8. Produto, Inflação e Desemprego Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 14 a 17.

Macro III - Ementa

303154 – Análise Macroeconômica III CR: 04 c.H. 60 P.E.L. 4.00.0 Pré-Requisito: 303155 EMENTA: Teorias do crescimento econômico. Crises econômicas, monetárias e financeiras. Política fiscal e monetária e suas limitações. Análise de problemas macroeconômicas da atualidade. Debates da macroeconomia. AVALIAÇÂO: Três provas (Abril, Maio, Junho), um trabalho (3-5 pp.), participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas. METODO: 1. Método: expositivo-dialógico 2. Procedimentos didáticos: - Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula - Apresentação de trabalhos de pesquisa e reflexão - Exercícios analíticos - Leituras reflexivas - Analise de exemplos - Discussão de temas de atualidade BIBLIOGRAFIA Livro de texto padrão: Olivier Blanchard: Macroeconomia. Pearson Education do Brasil. 4ª edição 2007 Cap.: 10-13; 22-23; 24-27 N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomia. Editora LTC. 1998 SITE: www.economianova.blogspot.com

Modelos e conhecimentos básicos da teoria macroeconômica

1. Cruz keynesiana 2. ISLM 3. Curva de Phillips 4. Curva de Phillips com expectativas 5. ISLMBP 6. Modelo monetarista 7. Expectativas racionais 8. Oferta e demanda agregada 9. Modelo de metas da inflação (Taylor rule) 10. Contabilidade social 11. Contabilidade de crescimento (growth accounting)

Liçoes da estagnação japonesa

Nomura data show com 26 slides sobre a estagnação japonesa. "O tempo da balance sheet recessão - O que pós Estados Unidos, Europa e China podem aprender de Japão 1990-2005" por Richard C. Koo, jefe economista do Instituto de Pesquisa de Nomura: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/081029_japan_koo.pdf Veja tambem: Historia da bolha japonesa http://www.scribd.com/doc/4882505/Japan-Economy-History

De Bush à Obama: O déficit federal

Economia Internacional - Ementa

303182 – Economia Internacional I CR: 04 c.H. 60 P.E.L. 4.00.0 Pré-Requisito: 303181 EMENTA: Origem das teorias do comércio internacional. Vantagens absolutas e vantagens relativas. Modelos e fatores específicos; modelo de Heckscher-Ohlin; modelo padrão de comércio. Política de comercia internacional, economias de escala e concorrência imperfeita, instrumentos e usos da política comercial. Balanço de pagamentos. Determinantes da taxa de câmbio e de fluxos de capital. AVALIAÇÂO: Três provas (Abril, Maio, Junho), um trabalho (3-5 pp.), participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas. METODO: 1. Método: expositivo-dialógico 2. Procedimentos didáticos: - Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula - Apresentação de trabalhos de pesquisa e reflexão - Exercícios analíticos - Leituras reflexivas - Analise de exemplos - Discussão de temas de atualidade BIBLIOGRAFIA Livro de texto padrão: Maria Auxiliadora de Carvalho e César Roberto Leite da Silva: Economia Internacional, Editora Saraiva. 3ª edicião 2006 Paul Krugman e Maurice Obstfeld, Economía Internacional. Teoria e Política. Makron Books SITE: http://www.economianova.blogspot.com/ PODCASTS e DATA SHOWS: http://continentaleconomics.com/AudioLectures.html BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR: AHEARNE, A., CLINE, W. R., LEE, K. T., PARK, Y.C., PISANI-FERRY, J, WILLIAMSON, J. Global Imbalances: time for action. Policy Brief, 07/4. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.ALESINA, A., BARRO, R. J., TENREYRO, S. (2002). Optimal Currency Areas. Texto disponível em: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/alesina/papers.html.ARIDA, P. (2003). Por uma moeda plenamente conversível. Revista de Economia Política,Vol 23, nº 3, Jul-SetARIDA, P. (2003b). Ainda sobre a conversibilidade. Revista de Economia Política,Vol 23, nº 3, Jul-Set.BACHA, E. Reflexões pós-cepalinas sobre inflação e crise externa. Revista de Economia Política , Vol 23, nº 3, Jul-Set..BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL (2001). Notas Explicativas ao Balanço de Pagamentos Compilado de Acordo com as Normas Estabelecidas na Quinta Edição do Manual de Balanço de Pagamentos do FMI. Disponível em: (www.bcb.gov.br) (texto 1)BAUMANN, R., CANUTO, O., GONÇALVES, R. (2004). Economia Internacional: teoria e experiência brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.BELLUZZO, L. G., CARNEIRO, R. (2004). O Mito da Conversibilidade. Revista de EconomiaPolítica,Vol 24, nº 2, abril-junho.BLANCHARD, O. (2002). Macroeconomia: teoria e política econômica. Rio de Janeiro: Campus.BLOCK, F. L (1977). The Origins of International Economic Disorder. (Las Orígenes del Desorden Económico Internacional, Fondo de Cultura, México, 1980).BRESSER PEREIRA, L.C., NAKANO, Y. (2003). Crescimento econômico com poupança externa?Revista de Economia Política, Vol. 23, nº 2, Abr-Jun . 2003.CARVALHO, M. A., SILVA, C. R. L. (1999). Economia Internacional. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva.CARVALHO, F. J. C., SOUZA, F.E.P., SICSÚ, J., PAULA, L. F. R., STUDART, R. (2007) Economia Monetária e Financeira: teoria e política, 2a. ed.. São Paulo, Campus.DOOLEY, M. P., FOLKERTS-LANDAU, D., GARBER, P (2005). International Financial Stability: Asia, Interest Rates, and the Dolar. (http://econ.ucsc.edu/~mpd/)EICHENGREEN, B. (2003). A Globalização do Capital. São Paulo: Editora 34.FEIJÓ, C. A., RAMOS, R. L. O., YOUNG, C. E. F., LIMA, F. C. G. C., GALVÃO, O., J. A (2001).Contabilidade Social: o novo sistema de contas nacionais do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus.KOSE, M.A., PRASAD, E. (2004). Liberalizing Capital Account Restrictions. Finance and Development, september 2004. Washington, DC: IMF (www.imf.org).KRUGMAN, P., OBSTFELD, M. (2005). Economia Internacional: teoria e política, 6 ed. , Pearson.OREIRO, J.L., DE PAULA, L. F., SILVA, G.J.C. (2004). Por uma Moeda Parcialmente Conversível.Revista de Economia Política,Vol 24, nº 2, abril-junho.PAPADIMITRIOU, D.B., SHAIKH, A., SANTOS, C. H., ZEZZA, G. How Fragile is the U.S. Economy? Strategic Analysis, march. New York: The Levy Economic Institute of Bard College, 2005 (www.levy.org).PAULANI, L., BRAGA, M (2006). A Nova Contabilidade Social. São Paulo, Saraiva.POLANYI, K. (1944). The Great Transformation (tradução para o português da Editora Elsevier, 9ª ed., 2000).PRASAD, E., ROGOFF, K., WEI, S., KOSE, M.A (2003). Effects of Financial Globalization onDeveloping Countries: Some Empirical Evidence. Washington, DC: IMF (www.imf.org).PRATES, D. (2004). A Assimetria das Contas Externas. Política Econômica em Foco, n.4. Campinas: Instituto de Economia da Unicamp (www.eco.unicam.br)PRATES, D. (2006). A inserção externa da economia brasileira no governo Lula. Política Econômica em Foco, n.7. Campinas: Instituto de Economia da Unicamp (www.eco.unicam.br)

Economia Internacional

Por causa de feriado na terça, não temos aula a segunda e por compensação tem a tarefa de fazer as "Questões para revisão" de nosso livro de texto pp. 23 e 24 Na quarta começamos com o capitulo 2 (Teoria da dotação relativa dos factores), pp. 25-43 Por favor preparar a aula e estudar os modelos e conceitos (função de produção, isocusto, curva de indiferença, fronteira de possibilidades de produção). Bom dia de feriado, prof. Antony

Macro III

Nossa próxima aula vai ter lugar na quinta (19/4). Na terça não vai ter aula por causa do dia de feriado. Como preparação estudar capitulo 10 (pp. 187 livro de texto de Blanchard). Em caso não tem conhecimentos sobre o modelo de demanda e oferta agregada (DA/OA), por favor preparar. O livro de texto de Blanchard trata este modelo no capitulo 7 pp. 127).

Racismo nos mercados financeiros?

(AP): The NAACP is accusing Wells Fargo and HSBC of forcing blacks into subprime mortgages while whites with identical qualifications got lower rates. Class-action lawsuits will be filed against the banks Friday in federal court in Los Angeles, Austin Tighe, co-lead counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, told The Associated Press. Black homebuyers have been 3 1/2 times more likely to receive a subprime loan than white borrowers, and six times more likely to get a subprime rate when refinancing, Tighe said. Blacks still were disproportionately steered into subprime loans when their credit scores, income and down payment were equal to those of white homebuyers, he said...-- http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090313/ap_on_re_us/naacp_mortgage_discrimination

Políticas contra a crise

SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Japan and China on Friday backed government spending to fight the global financial crisis, ahead of a G20 meeting at which the United States and Europe are split over the need for more aggressive stimulus measures. Japanese Finance Minister Kaoru Yosano urged world leaders to focus on giving an immediate boost to the global economy and promised to unveil new economic stimulus measures by April. China said it was ready to do more if needed to spur its growth. "The immediate issues are to stabilize the financial system (and) to get out of the present deflation threat facing the world economy," Yosano was quoted as saying in Friday's edition of the Financial Times. "These two are the most important things." Finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of 20 nations will meet near Brighton, England, on Friday and Saturday to discuss a roadmap to tackle the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. G20 leaders meet in London on April 2. The world's top economic powers are under pressure to deliver on pledges made in November, when they outlined an action plan to combat the crisis and guard against future meltdowns. But the run-up to this weekend's gathering has been dominated by disagreements over what the summit's priorities should be, and the degree to which countries should ramp up stimulus spending. Washington is urging the biggest industrialized countries to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product to boost demand and pull the global economy out of its tailspin, but France and Germany have rejected U.S. and British calls for fresh spending. "The international community must unite to tackle the downturn and set the path toward a sustainable future," British finance minister Alistair Darling said on Friday in a column in the Wall Street Journal. "We must do three things: boost demand, reform the global system of financial regulation, and increase the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)." The G20 represents more than 80 percent of the global economy, comprising the Group of Seven industrial nations -- all of which are in or near recession -- and key emerging markets such as Russia, China, India and Brazil. Early in the crisis, major central banks made coordinated rate cuts to spur demand but policy actions have been largely ad hoc since. Many governments announced multiple stimulus packages and massive bank rescue plans only to see their economies sink deeper into recession and their finances fall deeper in debt...-- http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE52A6D620090313?feedType=nl&feedName=usmorningdigest Os Estados Unidos querem mais gastos governamentais e encontram a opposição de França e Alemanha. O grupo de 20 (G20) inclue Brasil e estas vinte economias representam 80 por centos da economia mundial.

Empobrecimento

Familias americanas perdem trilhões em riqueza: WASHINGTON (AP) -- The net worth of American households fell by the largest amount in more than a half-century of record keeping during the fourth quarter of last year, reflecting the blow families are taking from a plunging stock market and dwindling home prices. The Federal Reserve said Thursday that household net worth dropped by a record 9 percent in 2008's October-December period compared to the third quarter. That was the biggest decline on records that go back to 1951. The drop represented a loss of $5.1 trillion in family net worth, leaving the total at $51.48 trillion at the end of the year. Net worth represents total assets such as homes and checking accounts minus liabilities like mortgages and credit card debt..." http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Household-net-worth-plunges-apf-14623113.html

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2009 UP AND DOWN WALL STREET DAILY Ignoring the Austrians Got Us in This Mess By RANDALL W. FORSYTH "...What definitely is ignored in academe is the Austrian school of economics, especially for baby boomers brought up on Samuelson's economics text, which was pure Keynesian orthodoxy. I did not learn the names von Mises and Hayek or their ideas until a decade or more after graduation (with a degree in economics, by the way.) The Austrian view is a mirror image on the right to Minsky's from the left. The economy, if left alone, is self-correcting, say the Austrians. But central banks' inflationary expansion of credit produces booms and malinvestments, which inevitably lead to a crashes and depressions. The only prevention for boom and busts are sound money, which is impossible with government-controlled central banks. Once the bust comes, the only cure is to let it run its course; allow the malinvestments go bankrupt and let the market reallocate the capital to productive uses... But the Austrians were the ones who could see the seeds of collapse in the successive credit booms, aided and abetted by Fed policies, especially under former chairman Alan Greenspan..." http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123680667244600275.html Veja tambem: The Bailout Reader. Link: http://mises.org/story/3128

Banco Central do Brasil vai baixar ainda mais a taxa de juros (SELIC)

March 12 (Bloomberg) -- Brazilian policy makers were unanimous in last night’s decision to cut the benchmark interest rate, signaling they’re prepared to reduce borrowing costs to a record low when they meet next month...-- http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=auI4K0RzmEWY&refer=latinamerica

Crise global: declinio de 50 000 bilhões de dólares

"... Falls in the value of financial assets worldwide might have reached more than $50,000bn, equivalent to a year’s global economic output, the Asian Development Bank will warn on Monday. Asia has been hit disproportionately hard, the bank will say, in a report that warns of many Asian stimulus plans lagging behind those of the leading global economies..." -- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3f9a2bd8-0c0e-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F3f9a2bd8-0c0e-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html%3Fnclick_check%3D1&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fabwblog.blogspot.com%2F&nclick_check=1

Brasil reduz taxa de juros

"... Com o agravamento da crise econômica, o Copom (Comitê de Política Monetária) do Banco Central decidiu nesta quarta-feira, por unanimidade, acelerar a queda dos juros e reduziu a taxa básica em 1,5 ponto percentual, cortando a Selic de 12,75% ao ano para 11,25% ao ano. Entenda como a taxa básica de juros influencia a economia Trata-se do segundo corte de juros desde a piora na crise, a partir de setembro. Em janeiro, o Copom reduziu a Selic de 13,75% para 12,75% --a próxima reunião será nos dias 28 e 29 de abril. A redução de hoje é a maior desde novembro de 2003, quando a taxa caiu de 19% para 17,50% ao ano. Com essa nova redução, a Selic voltou ao nível em que estava em março de 2008, o menor da história..." http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u532931.shtml

Aulas Economia Internacional

Caros alunos, na segunda que vem (16 de Março) não vai ter aula porque tem feriado em Aracaju no dia 17 de Março (mudança da capital). Para compensar tem de fazer as tarefas no fim do capitulo 1 de nosso livro de texto. Continuamos nos encontrar nas quartas as 17.20 horas e nas segundas as 17 horas como foi combinado. As provas estão previstas para começo de Abril (1. prova), começo de Maio (2. prova) e começo de Junho (3. prova) com as temáticas de Comercio internacional (1.) Balanço de pagamentos (2.) Finanças internacionais (3.). Se tem perguntas pode usar o acesso de comentários nesta página. Bom feriado, abraço, prof. Antony

Economia Internacional: Trade World Report

Documentação anual do Banco Mundial sobre o comércio internacional, o "Trade World Report". Veja: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr534_e.htm Conteúdo "... Trade has allowed nations to benefit from specialization and economies of scale to produce more efficiently. It has raised productivity, supported the spread of knowledge and new technologies, and enriched the range of choices available to consumers. But deeper integration into the world economy has not always proved popular, nor have the benefits of trade and globalization necessarily reached all sections of society. As a consequence, trade scepticism is on the rise in certain quarters.This year’s World Trade Report, entitled “Trade in a Globalizing World”, is devoted to an examination of the gains from international trade and the challenges arising from higher levels of integration..."

Economia Internacional - teorias de comércio exterior

Resumo das principais teorias de comércio exterior Contents: Mercantilism Absolute advantage Comparative advantage Factor proportions Leontief paradox Product life cycle Technology and trade Summary: no all-purpose trade theoryTrade traps Fonte: http://faculty.washington.edu/jwh/349lec03.htm

A grande depressão

"... How bad was the Great Depression? Over the four years from 1929 to 1933, production at the nation’s factories, mines and utilities fell by more than half. People’s real disposable incomes dropped 28 percent. Stock prices collapsed to one-tenth of their pre-crash height. The number of unemployed Americans rose from 1.6 million in 1929 to 12.8 million in 1933. One of every four workers was out of a job at the Depression’s nadir, and ugly rumors of revolt simmered for the first time since the Civil War..." http://fee.org/articles/great-myths-of-the-great-depression/print/

EU: Base monetária

Keynesianismo japonês

"... Most Japanese economists have tended to take a bleaker view of their nation’s track record, saying that Japan spent more than enough money, but wasted too much of it on roads to nowhere and other unneeded projects. Dr. Ihori of the University of Tokyo did a survey of public works in the 1990s, concluding that the spending created almost no additional economic growth. Instead of spreading beneficial ripple effects across the economy, he found that the spending actually led to declines in business investment by driving out private investors..." http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/asia/06japan.html?_r=4&hp=&pagewanted=all

Keynes em Japão

Macroeconomia de Japão

O fracaso da política keynesiana japonesa

HAMADA, Japan — The Hamada Marine Bridge soars majestically over this small fishing harbor, so much larger than the squid boats anchored below that it seems out of place. And it is not just the bridge. Two decades of generous public works spending have showered this city of 61,000 mostly graying residents with a highway, a two-lane bypass, a university, a prison, a children’s art museum, the Sun Village Hamada sports center, a bright red welcome center, a ski resort and an aquarium featuring three ring-blowing Beluga whales..." Leia mais sobre os gastos governamentais de Japão para "estimular" a economia: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/asia/06japan.html?_r=4&hp=&pagewanted=all

O que significa "Keynesiano"?

" ... What does "being Keynesian" mean? Simply believing in the role of demand-side factors in the determination of aggregate output is an insufficient characterisation. A true Keynesian differs, in so much as he also believes that: 1) monetary policy is not the most effective tool for stabilising the economy and it may be completely ineffective in some circumstances (liquidity trap); 2) fiscal policy is effective and government spending is the preferred tool; 3) government intervention works and short-run consequences are more important than long-run ones. With this definition in mind, there could be four ways in which the statement "we are all Keynesians now" can be interpreted. I propose that the statement is false in three out of four of these interpretations. The first interpretation is that the economic profession has reached a consensus on Keynesian positions. This statement is definitely false. If you browse through the articles published in the leading journal of the American Economic Association in 2008, you would find that only one of the 12 articles that deal with macroeconomic issues (JEL Code E) supports (albeit very indirectly) the idea of a fiscal policy expansion as a policy tool. An even stronger imbalance is present at the pinnacle of our profession. Among the 37 Economics Nobel prize winners in the last 20 years, four received the prize for their contributions to macroeconomics. None of these could be considered Keynesian. In fact, it is hard to find academic papers supporting the idea of a fiscal stimulus. The second possible interpretation is that there exists a consensus among economists that the causes of the current crisis are Keynesian. Even under this interpretation the statement is patently false. I do not think that any economist would dare to say that the current US economic crisis has been caused by underconsumption. With zero personal saving and a large budget deficit the Bush administration has run one of the most aggressive Keynesian policies in history. Not only has adherence to Keynes's principles not averted the current economic disaster, it has greatly contributed to causing it. The Keynesian desire to manage aggregate demand, ignoring the long-run costs, pushed Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke to keep interest rates extremely low in 2002, fuelling excessive consumption by the household sector and excessive risk-taking by the financial sector. Most importantly, it has been the Keynesian training of our policy-makers that has led them to ignore the role that incentives play in economic decisions. The main difference between Keynes and modern economics is the focus on incentives. Keynes studied the relation between macroeconomic aggregates, without any consideration for the underlying incentives that lead to the formation of these aggregates. By contrast, modern economics base all their analysis on incentives. In 1998, when the Fed co-ordinated the bail-out of Long Term Capital Management, it did not care about the impact this decision would have on the incentives to take risk and price liquidity appropriately. When Mr Bernanke engineered the bail-out of Bear Stearns, he did not care about the impact this decision would have on the other investment banks' incentives to raise equity capital at rock-bottom prices. When he changed his position twice in the space of two days, letting Lehman fail, but bailing out AIG, he did not care about the impact it would have on investors' confidence and incentives to invest. It is this erratic behaviour that has spooked the market and created the current economic crisis: in a recent survey 80% of Americans declare that they are less confident of investing in the market as a result of the way the government has intervened. If Keynesian principles and education are the cause of the current depression, it is hard to imagine they can be the solution. Thus, even the third interpretation of the house statement—that we should follow Keynesian prescriptions to combat the current economic crisis—is false. I am not disputing the idea that some government intervention can alleviate the current economic conditions, I am disputing that a Keynesian economic policy can do it. With a current-account deficit that in 2008 was $614 billion, a budget deficit that was $455 billion and military expenditures of $731 billion, it is hard to argue that the government is not stimulating demand sufficiently. The current crisis is not a demand crisis, it is a trust crisis. Bad corporate governance coupled with bad government policies has destroyed the financial sector, scaring investors and freezing lending. It is as if a nuclear bomb had destroyed all roads in America and we claimed that to alleviate the economic impact of such an event we should invest in banks. It is possible that eventually the effect will trickle down. But if the problem is the roads, you want to rebuild roads, not subsidise the financial sector. And if the problem is the financial sector, you want to fix this and not build roads. The only interpretation under which the house statement is true is that "we"—the English/American people and their elective representatives—are all Keynesians now. Keynesianism has conquered the hearts and minds of politicians and ordinary people alike because it provides a theoretical justification for irresponsible behaviour. Medical science has established that one or two glasses of wine per day are good for your long-term health, but no doctor would recommend a recovering alcoholic to follow this prescription. Unfortunately, Keynesian economists do exactly this. They tell politicians, who are addicted to spending our money, that government expenditures are good. And they tell consumers, who are affected by severe spending problems, that consuming is good, while saving is bad. In medicine, such behaviour would get you expelled from the medical profession; in economics, it gives you a job in Washington." --- http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/276

Contra Keynes e o Keynesianismo moderno

"... Robert Barro, Harvard University, said of the Obama fiscal stimulus proposal: "This is probably the worst bill that has been put forward since the 1930s. I don't know what to say. I mean it's wasting a tremendous amount of money. It has some simplistic theory that I don't think will work ... I don't think it will expand the economy ... It's more along the lines of throwing money at people ... I think it's garbage." (Barro seems to be talking about any and all stimulus bills). John Cochrane, University of Chicago, said: "It's not part of what anybody has taught graduate students since the 1960s … They are fairy tales that have been proved false. It is very comforting in times of stress to go back to the fairy tales we heard as children but it doesn't make them less false." To borrow money to pay for the spending, the government will issue bonds, which means investors will be buying US Treasuries instead of investing in equities or products, negating the stimulative effect, Cochrane added. Edward Prescott, Arizona State University, who won a Nobel prize for economics in 2004 for his study on business cycles, made this contribution: "Massive government spending likely lengthened the economic struggles each time. Economists in the field are deeply divided on the issue of federal stimulus … I don't know why Obama said all economists agree on this. They don't. If you go down to the third-tier schools, yes, but they're not the people advancing the science." Eugene Fama, University of Chicago, stated: "Bail-outs and stimulus plans are funded by issuing more government debt. (The money must come from somewhere!) The added debt absorbs savings that would otherwise go to private investment. In the end, despite the existence of idle resources, bail-outs and stimulus plans do not add to current resources in use. They just move resources from one use to another." The argument that Messrs Fama, Prescott, Cochrane, Barro, Poole and company are making is what economists call Say's law. It is the claim that decisions to increase spending—whether they come from the government or anybody else—cannot spur the economy and raise employment and production because demand must be created by supply. If the government spends, somebody else must cut back on their spending. Anyone who uses his or her eyes can determine that Say's law is in general false. Recall 2003-06, when capital inflows from Asia, easy money provided by the Federal Reserve and promises that financial engineering would cheaply diversify risk spurred homebuilders to spend money building houses. The American unemployment rate fell from 6.0% to 4.8%. Recall 1996-2000, when the assembled investors of America discovered the internet and in response businesses spent money like water on computers and telephones. The American unemployment rate fell 5.6% to 4.3%. In general, spending works to spur the economy, and the government's money when spent is as good as anybody else's. Even though Say's law is not true in general, could it possibly be true in this particular case? Could it happen that as the government starts its spending that the spending is, in Fama's words, "funded by issuing more government debt ... The added debt absorbs savings that would otherwise go to private investment ... and just moves resources from one use [private investment] to another [government purchases]"? Yes, it can happen. When government deficit spending triggers a sharp rise in interest rates, that rise in interest rates will discourage and crowd out private investment spending. But you have to have that rise in interest rates, and we don't: the ten-year Treasury rate last Friday was 3.02% per year, down from 4.01% back before Obama's election victory. Milton Friedman had some very harsh things to say about the Great Depression predecessors of Fama, Prescott, Cochrane, Barro, Poole and company when he contrasted his vision of Chicago-school monetary economics with theirs: "Chicago was one of the few academic centers at which the quantity theory continued to be ... central and vigorous ... throughout the 1930s and 1940s, where students continued to study monetary theory and to write theses on monetary problems. The quantity theory that retained this role differed sharply from the atrophied and rigid caricature that is so frequently described by the proponents of the new Keynesian income-expenditure approach—and with some justice, to judge by much of the literature on policy that was spawned by old quantity theorists." ... -- http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/276

Krugman quer mais gastos públicos

Paul Krugman escreve: "President Obama’s plan to stimulate the economy was “massive,” “giant,” “enormous.” So the American people were told, especially by TV news, during the run-up to the stimulus vote. Watching the news, you might have thought that the only question was whether the plan was too big, too ambitious. Yet many economists, myself included, actually argued that the plan was too small and too cautious. The latest data confirm those worries — and suggest that the Obama administration’s economic policies are already falling behind the curve..." http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/opinion/09krugman.html?_r=2&ref=opinion&pagewanted=print

Política de demanda agregada

"... Barack Obama’s top economic adviser has urged world leaders to pump more public money into the economy in a co-ordinated effort to boost demand and lift the world out of recession. In an interview with the Financial Times, Lawrence Summers said the urgent need for a short-term increase in spending by governments temporarily overrode the longer-term goal of tackling the global imbalances many economists believe caused the financial crisis..." http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d8b5e18-0c14-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1

Reservas livres no sistema bancario dos EU

Base monetária

"Salvar" a economia pode causar nova onda de inflação

March 9 (Bloomberg) -- Billionaire Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway Inc. posted its worst results ever in 2008, said the economy “has fallen off a cliff” and that efforts to stimulate recovery may lead to inflation higher than the 1970s.

Americans are fearful, confused and changing their buying habits, which is showing up at Berkshire’s operating units, Buffett said during an appearance on the CNBC television network today. U.S. stocks fell after Buffett’s comments, following the worst weekly slump in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index since November.

“We are doing things now that are potentially very inflationary,” Buffett said... Fonte

Sobre bilhões e trilhões

SANTA MONICA, Calif. (MarketWatch) -- There's a $700 trillion elephant in the room and it's time we found out how much it really weighs on the economy. Derivative contracts total about three-quarters of a quadrillion dollars in "notional" amounts, according to the Bank for International Settlements. These contracts are tallied in notional values because no one really can say how much they are worth. But valuing them correctly is exactly what we should be doing because these comprise the viral disease that has infected the financial markets and the economies of the world. Try as we might to salvage the residential real estate market, it's at best worth $23 trillion in the U.S. We're struggling to save the stock market, but that's valued at less than $15 trillion. And we hope to keep the entire U.S. economy from collapsing, yet gross domestic product stands at $14.2 trillion. Compare any of these to the derivatives market and you can easily see that we are just closing the windows as a tsunami crashes to shore. The total value of all the stock markets in the world amounts to less than $50 trillion, according to the World Federation of Exchanges...." http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/The-700-trillion-elephant-room/story.aspx?guid={024DB809-8506-4AA9-83BB-B053FD4E1C11}

Os 25 culpados pela crise (apud Time)

Fuente: Mauricio David"Revista Time elege os 25 culpados pela crise econômica" Após tentar achar as causas e soluções à crise financeira mundial, a busca agora é pelos possíveis responsáveis que levaram empresas a falirem, causando demissões e a ameaça de recessão global. Primeiro, o jornal inglês The Times listou os possíveis dez principais culpados. Nesta quinta-feira, foi a vez da revista Time selecionar 25 empresários, economistas e políticos que levaram a economia mundial às turbulências atuais. Entre os considerados responsáveis está Angelo Mozilo, ex-diretor e fundador da Countrywide (maior financiadora imobiliária dos Estados Unidos). Segundo a Time, a empresa não foi a primeira a fazer "financiamentos exóticos com habilidade questionável", mas o fez. O jornal britânico The Times diz que Mozilo é acusado de empurrar crédito para quem não poderia pagar, enquanto isso recebia um salário anual de US$ 470 milhões. Presidente do Comitê de Bancos do Senado entre 1995 e 2000, Phil Gramm isentou o credit-default swaps (CDS, espécie de seguro para crédito de risco) de regulação. E, segundo a revista, foi exatamente o CDS que levou o AIG à quebra. Ex-presidente do Federal Reserve (FED, banco central americano) Alan Greenspan foi colocado na lista da Time por seu "desprezo" pela regulação de mercado, considerada hoje uma das principais causas da crise. Em outubro de 2008, durante uma audiência no Congresso, Greenspan admitiu que "cometeu um erro ao presumir" que os mercados financeiros poderiam regular a si próprios. Christopher Cox, ex-chefe do Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), é culpado por nunca ter percebido ou agido nas acusações contra o investidor Bernard Madoff , que realizou fraude de US$ 50 bilhões com vítimas em todo o mundo. Além disso, é acusado pela revista de não ter regulado instituições para tentar impedir o colapso. A Time também culpa os consumidores americanos pela crise. Segundo a publicação, os empréstimos e gastos excessivos foram alguns dos principais responsáveis pela situação econômica atual. Secretário do Tesouro dos EUA de 2006 até o fim do governo de George W. Bush, Henry Paulson é um dos responsáveis citados por ter demorado para agir em meio aos primeiros sinais de crise, por permitir a falência do Lehman Brothers e por causa do pacote de US$ 750 bilhões, que foi uma "grande bagunça". John Cassano é um dos fundadores da unidade de produtos financeiros da AIG e administrou o grupo até o início de 2008 - pouco antes de a empresa pedir ajuda do governo para não falir. Por esse motivo, ele é citado como um dos responsáveis pela crise. Até hoje, o governo americano já investiu US$ 150 bilhões para evitar a quebra da empresa. Ian McCarthy, CEO da imobiliária Beazer Homes, é acusado de usar táticas agressivas para vendas e inclusive mentir sobre as qualificações de consumidores para ajudá-los a conseguir empréstimos, tendo participado ativamente do que iniciou a crise. Presidente da Fannie Mae até 2004, Franklin Raines deixou a companhia em meio a um escândalo administrativo e o início dos grandes investimentos em subprime. As agências de classificação de riscos, que deram notas máximas "em grandes proporções" e até a companhias de risco, também são citadas pela Time. Kathleen Corbet, que comandou a Standard & Poor's foi considerada uma das culpadas pela crise. Conhecido como o "gorila de Wall Street", Dick Fuld direcionou o Lehman Brothers diretamente ao subprime. "Por sua incompetência", Fuld foi selecionado para a lista. Herb e Marion Sandler foram os primeiros a oferecer empréstimos imobiliários "perigosos", por meio do World Savings Bank. O Goldman Sachs estima que cerca de metade dos dois milhões de consumidores que possuem esse tipo de financiamento não vão conseguir pagar o valor total. A administração do ex-presidente americano Bill Clinton foi caracterizada por prosperidade econômica e por desregular o mercado financeiro, que podem ter influenciado os excessos das empresas dos últimos anos. Também é listado como um dos responsáveis o ex-presidente George W. Bush, também acusado de não incentivar a regulação do mercado. Mas Bush também foi colocado na lista pelo simples fato de a crise ter desencadeado durante sua administração. O CEO do Merrill Lynch até 2007, Stan O'Neal, foi responsável por transformar o negócio da empresa, mas apoiando-se em subprime e empréstimos. O primeiro-ministro chinês, Wen Jiabao, também é relacionado na lista da Time. O motivo é a China ser a principal credora dos Estados Unidos. Segundo a revista, o crédito baixo é o grande causador da crise. David Lereah era o economista-chefe da associação americana de corretores quando disse que o mercado imobiliário iria crescer por muito tempo. Por esse motivo, ele foi considerado um dos culpados pela crise. Os fundos de investimentos do tipo hedge funds são responsáveis pela má administração de empréstimos por comprarem crédito hipotecário. John Devaney tornou rentável empresas de crédito por fazer empréstimos questionáveis. O americano Bernard Madoff é acusado de uma fraude de US$ 50 bilhões a investidores, tornando-se o maior fraudador de todos os tempos dos Estados Unidos. Seu golpe foi descoberto em meio à crise, quando seus clientes tentaram resgatar seus investimentos. Considerado o pai do sistema de crédito hipotecário, Lew Ranieri também está na lista da publicação. Foi quando consumidores pararam de pagar seus empréstimos deste tipo que os bancos de investimentos entraram na crise. Burton Jablin criou programas de TV que ajudaram a inflar a bolha do mercado imobiliário americano, ao ensinar os espectadores a valorizar suas casas ao máximo. Segundo a revista, economistas consideram Fred Goodwin, ex-chefe do Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), "o pior banqueiro do mundo". Sua "ganância" fez o banco adquirir outras 20 instituições. O pior, segundo a Time, foi ele não ter parado aí e liderou a compra do ABN Amro por US$ 100 bilhões, prejudicando as reservas do RBS. Sandy Weill, dono do Citigroup, está na lista pelas aquisições do Smith Barney e Travelers. Segundo a revista, bancos muito grandes são os piores problemas econômicos dos Estados Unidos. Cada instituição financeira parece muito grande para falir, levando o governo a gastar bilhões de dólares para evitar quebras. David Oddsson foi primeiro-ministro da Islândia e, depois, presidente do banco central, levando o país a uma nova era de mercados livres e privatizando três dos principais bancos. As instituições financeiras não resistiram a crise e lutam para não quebrar. A má administração do Bear Stearns levou Jimmy Cayne a integrar a lista. Segundo a publicação, Cayne tinha finais de semana prolongados para jogar golfe, saía da cidade para torneios esportivos e é acusado de fumar maconha (o que nega). ______________________ Marie-Christine LACOSTE, CNRS, Information Scientifique Coordinadora de "RUMBOS" Lista de Informacion y Red de Investigadores sobre y de America Latina (Ciencias Sociales - Politicas, Economicas, Desarrollo Urbano y Rural...)Idiomas circulando en la Lista : Espanol, Ingles, Portugues, FrancesDireccion Postal : Maison de la Recherche, Université de Toulouse-le-Mirail5, Allées Antonio Machado - 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9 (France)e.mail : lacoste@univ-tlse2.fr Telefono oficina : 05 61 50 47 34

Detroit, EU, casas para um dólar e menos

"... In extreme cases, homes are on sale for $1 or less, which has enticed investors to Detroit from as far away as the United Kingdom and Australia..."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090309/ap_on_bi_ge/landlord_nation

A bolsa de valores (DJI) deste a eleição de Obama

Empobrecimento súbito

Folha Online: "Os norte-americanos estão enfrentando um súbito processo de empobrecimento que já destruiu cerca de US$ 16,5 trilhões da riqueza disponível entre as famílias nos últimos 15 meses. Os números são do IIF (Instituto de Finanças Internacionais), que reúne 380 grandes bancos, e foram divulgados em antecipação a dados semelhantes a serem publicados pelo Fed (o banco central dos EUA) nos próximos dias..." Leia mais: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u531248.shtml

Colapso de emprego - Estados Unidos

Petrobras

"... A Petrobras anunciou nesta sexta-feira que obteve lucro líquido recorde de R$ 33,915 bilhões em 2008, alta de 58% sobre 2007, resultado principalmente do alto preço do petróleo até o início do segundo semestre..." --

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u530756.shtml

Argentina

Por mais de 50 anos este país toma os passos errados na política econômica e ainda não para: "O governo da Argentina deu mais um passo ontem em sua escalada protecionista e impôs entraves à importação de 60 grupos de produtos do Mercosul, entre têxteis, eletrodomésticos e móveis, informa THIAGO GUIMARÃES em reportagem na Folha (íntegra disponível para assinantes do UOL e do jornal). --- http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u530301.shtml No começo do século 20, Argentina era um dos países mais rícos do mundo, e ainda nos anos 50 era mais rico de Italia. A destruição de Argentina não foi feito por fora. Foi feito por os seus propios líderes politicos. Argentina é o caso prominente das conseqüencias do "populismo econômico".

A tarefa do economista

O verdadeiro economista é que não apenas veja o efeito à curto prazo, mas também à longo prazo e que analisa as conseqüências de uma política não apenas para um grupo, mas para todos os grupos.

Crescimento e queda do emprego formal em Brasil

O Brasil visto do exterior

Foto no The Economist de um artigo sobre a economia brasileira.

Link: http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13243343&source=hptextfeature

Política fiscal expansiva em consideração

March 5 (Bloomberg) -- Brazil’s government has room to cut taxes and increase public works spending to spur economic growth, Finance Minister Guido Mantega said. The finance minister said the government can undertake “expansionary fiscal policy, with tax cuts and increasing public investment” to buttress Latin America’s biggest economy against the global financial crisis. Against the backdrop of slowing growth and declining tax revenue, the finance minister’s remarks raise questions about the government’s commitment to maintaining its budget targets, Nick Chamie, head of emerging market research at RBC Capital Markets in Toronto, said. -- http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aLDvc0fX6Wq8&refer=news

Gráfico interativo das taxas de juros dos Estados Unidos, Japão, Euro e Grã-Bretanha 1970 - 2009 http://www.handelsblatt.com/homepage/entwicklung_leitzinsen/

Bailout

March 5 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner told Congress the Obama administration will act to make sure the nation’s largest financial companies can get government help if needed to avoid collapse. “It is very important -- and we will do this -- to make sure that the major institutions in our country have the resources and the funding and the ability to play their continuing role in our markets going forward,” he said in testimony today before the House Budget Committee when asked about Citigroup Inc., which received a new round of federal aid last month. “That’s a very important commitment.” -- http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aFaMsyWaYsX4&refer=home Veja o "Bailout Reader": http://mises.org/story/3128

A queda do Citigroup

-- March 5 (Bloomberg) -- Citigroup Inc. dropped below $1 in New York trading for the first time, the latest sign that stock investors are losing confidence in a company that was once the world’s biggest bank by market value. The stock fell to 99 cents at 11:22 a.m. on the New York Stock Exchange, marking an 85 percent decline this year and giving the company a market value of $5.5 billion. At its peak in late 2006, Citigroup stock was worth $55.70, giving the company a market value of $277.2 billion. Citigroup has reported more than $37.5 billion in net losses during the last five quarters and the U.S. government has provided the company with $45 billion. Last week, the government agreed to convert the preferred stock it owned in Citigroup to common shares, gaining a 36 percent stake in the company and boosting its buffer against future losses..." http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aKLJO8S5nFaU&refer=home

The Bailout Reader

Com mais de 850 000 citações no Internet : http://search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt=A0geu9j2NK9J5KsAbBFXNyoA?p=%22The++Bailout+Reader%22&y=Search&fr=yfp-t-501&fp_ip=BR&rd=r1&meta=vc%3Dbr com 2 artigos de Prof. Antony

Video Palestras

click on "begin" para iniciar o show depois entrar no link! Currency Arrangements in Europe. Are there Lessons for Latin America? Dr. Antony Mueller 29 de enero de 2004 3,852 visitas Safeguarding the Independence of the European Central Bank Dr. Antony Mueller 28 de enero de 2004 4,446 visitas Do Current Account Deficits Matter? Dr. Antony Mueller 27 de enero de 2004 6,597 visitas Financial Cycles, Business Activity and Asset Valuations Dr. Antony Mueller 26 de enero de 2004 4,937 visitas Inflation and Deflation in a New Capital-Based Macroeconomic Antony Mueller 9 de febrero de 2006

Video palestra sobre a crise financeira

Assista à palestra dada pelo presidente do Instituto Mises Brasil, Helio Beltrão, na FGV-SP/AIESEC, sobre a atual crise financeira Tema: A crise do crédito, suas origens e desdobramentos Instituto Mises Brasil - palestra FGV - parte 1 de 4 Instituto Mises Brasil - palestra FGV - parte 2 de 4 Instituto Mises - palestra FGV - parte 3 de 4 Instituto Mises - palestra FGV - parte 4 de 4 Aproveite também para visitar o canal do IMB no youtube, atualizado continuamente: http://www.youtube.com/user/misesbrasil

Economia Internacional

Podcasts das aulas em Economia Internacional do Prof. Antony Link: http://continentaleconomics.com/AudioLectures.html

Links

Em caso os links das postagens não funcionam automaticamente, se precisa copiar e inserir manualmente na janela.

Data show sobre a crise financeira

House of Cards - Origins of the Financial Crisis ''Then and Now'' "Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters." --Internal email, Wall Street, 12/15/06 Prophetic words that predicted the greatest financial collapse since the Great Depression. The current global economic collapse has its roots in the sub-prime mortgage crisis. http://www.cnbc.com/id/28993790/28892719

O Colapso Americano

Video palestra em Português de Helio Beltrão sobre as raízes da crise financeira: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMYPB2tLxc4

Modelo errado

Financial meltdown blamed on risk models Web posted at: 2/14/2009 9:20:18 Source ::: FINANCIAL TIMES By Norma Cohen The failure of banks to count, manage and hedge their risks over the past decade is responsible both for the fantastic growth before 2007 and the crash that followed, according to the Bank of England’s director for financial stability. In a speech at a risk management conference yesterday, Andrew Haldane described how the world’s banking system found itself on the brink of collapse after a decade of self-congratulation at having conquered risk. The meltdown in money markets that followed the credit squeeze was an event that banks’ risk models showed could happen only once in the lifetime of the universe - once every 13.7bn years — Haldane said. Referring to economist John Maynard Keynes’ rule of thumb that it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong. Banking losses now “lie anywhere between a very large number and an unthinkable one”, he said. In pinpointing reasons why the systems banks use to gauge how big their losses could be under worst-case scenarios were so wrong, Haldane noted that most are based on a very short-term view of the past.

A maior bolha da historia

By MARC FABER The world has gone from the greatest synchronized global economic boom in history to the first synchronized global bust since the Great Depression. How we got here is not a cautionary tale of free markets gone wild. Rather, it's the story of what can happen when governments ignore market signals and central bankers believe in endless booms. Following the March 2000 Nasdaq bust, the Federal Reserve began to slash the fed-funds rate from 6.5% in January 2001 to 1.75% by year-end and then to 1% in 2003. (This despite the fact that officially the U.S. economy had begun to recover in November 2001). Almost three years into the economic expansion, the Fed began to increase the fed-funds rate in baby steps beginning June 2004 from 1% to 5.25% in August 2006. But because interest rates during this time continuously lagged behind nominal GDP growth as well as cost of living increases, the Fed never truly implemented tight monetary policies. Indeed, total credit increased in the U.S. from an annual growth rate of 7% in the June 2004 quarter to over 16% in early 2007. It grew five-times faster than nominal GDP between 2001 and 2007. The complete mispricing of money, combined with a cornucopia of financial innovations, led to the housing boom and allowed buyers to purchase homes with no down payments and homeowners to refinance their existing mortgages. A consumption boom followed, which was not accompanied by equal industrial production and capital spending increases. Consequently the U.S. trade and current-account deficit expanded -- the latter from 2% of GDP in 1998 to 7% in 2006, thus feeding the world with approximately $800 billion in excess liquidity that year. When American consumption began to boom on the back of the housing bubble, the explosion of imports into the U.S. were largely provided by China and other Asian countries. Rising exports from China led to that country's strong domestic industrial production, income and consumption gains, as well as very high capital spending as capacities needed to be expanded in order to meet the export demand. An economic boom in China drove the demand for oil and other commodities up. Rapidly accumulating wealth allowed the resource producers in the Middle East, Latin America and elsewhere to go on a shopping binge for luxury goods and capital goods from Europe and Japan. As a consequence of this expansionary cycle, the world experienced between 2001 and 2007 the greatest synchronized economic boom in the history of capitalism... -- Lea mais: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123491436689503909.html

O fim do livre mercado?

http://www.ft. com/cms/s/ 0/2802e3a8- f77c-11dd- 81f7-000077b0765 8.html?nclick_ check=1 Adam Smith gets the last laugh By P.J. O’Rourke Published: February 10 2009 19:22 | Last updated: February 10 2009 19:22 The free market is dead. It was killed by the Bolshevik Revolution, fascist dirigisme, Keynesianism, the Great Depression, the second world war economic controls, the Labour party victory of 1945, Keynesianism again, the Arab oil embargo, Anthony Giddens’s “third way” and the current financial crisis. The free market has died at least 10 times in the past century. And whenever the market expires people want to know what Adam Smith would say. It is a moment of, “Hello, God, how’s my atheism going?” Adam Smith would be laughing too hard to say anything. Smith spotted the precise cause of our economic calamity not just before it happened but 232 years before – probably a record for going short. “A dwelling-house, as such, contributes nothing to the revenue of its inhabitant,” Smith said in The Wealth of Nations. “If it is lett [sic] to a tenant for rent, as the house itself can produce nothing, the tenant must always pay the rent out of some other revenue.” Therefore Smith concluded that, although a house can make money for its owner if it is rented, “the revenue of the whole body of the people can never be in the smallest degree increased by it”. [281]* Smith was familiar with rampant speculation, or “overtrading” as he politely called it. The Mississippi Scheme and the South Sea Bubble had both collapsed in 1720, three years before his birth. In 1772, while Smith was writing The Wealth of Nations, a bank run occurred in Scotland. Only three of Edinburgh’s 30 private banks survived. The reaction to the ensuing credit freeze from the Scottish overtraders sounds familiar, “The banks, they seem to have thought,” Smith said, “were in honour bound to supply the deficiency, and to provide them with all the capital which they wanted to trade with.” [308] The phenomenon of speculative excess has less to do with free markets than with high profits. “When the profits of trade happen to be greater than ordinary,” Smith said, “overtrading becomes a general error.” [438] And rate of profit, Smith claimed, “is always highest in the countries that are going fastest to ruin”. [266] The South Sea Bubble was the result of ruinous machinations by Britain’s lord treasurer, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, who was looking to fund the national debt. The Mississippi Scheme was started by the French regent Philippe duc d’Orléans when he gave control of the royal bank to the Scottish financier John Law, the Bernard Madoff of his day. Law’s fellow Scots – who were more inclined to market freedoms than the English, let alone the French – had already heard Law’s plan for “establishing a bank ... which he seems to have imagined might issue paper to the amount of the whole value of all the lands in the country”. The parliament of Scotland, Smith noted, “did not think proper to adopt it”. [317] One simple idea allows an over-trading folly to turn into a speculative disaster – whether it involves ocean commerce, land in Louisiana, stocks, bonds, tulip bulbs or home mortgages. The idea is that unlimited prosperity can be created by the unlimited expansion of credit. Such wild flights of borrowing can be effected only with what Smith called “the Daedalian wings of paper money”. [321] To produce enough of this paper requires either a government or something the size of a government, which modern merchant banks have become. As Smith pointed out: “The government of an exclusive company of merchants, is, perhaps, the worst of all governments.” [570] The idea that The Wealth of Nations puts forth for creating prosperity is more complex. It involves all the baffling intricacies of human liberty. Smith proposed that everyone be free – free of bondage and of political, economic and regulatory oppression (Smith’s principle of “self-interest” ), free in choice of employment (Smith’s principle of “division of labour”), and free to own and exchange the products of that labour (Smith’s principle of “free trade”). “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence,” Smith told a learned society in Edinburgh (with what degree of sarcasm we can imagine), “but peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of justice.” How then would Adam Smith fix the present mess? Sorry, but it is fixed already. The answer to a decline in the value of speculative assets is to pay less for them. Job done. We could pump the banks full of our national treasure. But Smith said: “To attempt to increase the wealth of any country, either by introducing or by detaining in it an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver, is as absurd as it would be to attempt to increase the good cheer of private families, by obliging them to keep an unnecessary number of kitchen utensils.” [440] We could send in the experts to manage our bail-out. But Smith said: “I have never known much good done by those who affect to trade for the public good.” [456] And we could nationalise our economies. But Smith said: “The state cannot be very great of which the sovereign has leisure to carry on the trade of a wine merchant or apothecary”. [818] Or chairman of General Motors. * Bracketed numbers in the text refer to pages in ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Glasgow Edition of the Works of Adam Smith, Oxford University Press, 1976 The writer is a contributing editor at The Weekly Standard and is the author, most recently, of On The Wealth of Nations, Books That Changed the World, published by Atlantic Books, 2007

A "nova" política externa do presidente Obama

A "nova" política econômica do presidente Obama

Ele não sabe nada sobre a economia

Presidente Obama tem o nivel pré-scolar de conhecimento sobre a economia. A única diferença entre o conhecimento de uma criança sobre como funcionar a economia e ele é o talento retórico de Obama. Veja: http://cosmos.bcst.yahoo.com/up/player/popup/?rn=3906861&cl=4226934&ch=4226736&src=news

O papel do governo em criar a crise financeira

How Government Created the Financial Crisis Research shows the failure to rescue Lehman did not trigger the fall panic. By JOHN B. TAYLOR Many are calling for a 9/11-type commission to investigate the financial crisis. Any such investigation should not rule out government itself as a major culprit. My research shows that government actions and interventions -- not any inherent failure or instability of the private economy -- caused, prolonged and dramatically worsened the crisis. David GothardThe classic explanation of financial crises is that they are caused by excesses -- frequently monetary excesses -- which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. This crisis was no different: A housing boom followed by a bust led to defaults, the implosion of mortgages and mortgage-related securities at financial institutions, and resulting financial turmoil. Monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, especially in 2003-2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say what good policy should be based on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that worked well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented the boom and the bust. Researchers at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have provided corroborating evidence from other countries: The greater the degree of monetary excess in a country, the larger was the housing boom. The effects of the boom and bust were amplified by several complicating factors including the use of subprime and adjustable-rate mortgages, which led to excessive risk taking. There is also evidence the excessive risk taking was encouraged by the excessively low interest rates. Delinquency rates and foreclosure rates are inversely related to housing price inflation. These rates declined rapidly during the years housing prices rose rapidly, likely throwing mortgage underwriting programs off track and misleading many people. The Opinion Journal Widget Download Opinion Journal's widget and link to the most important editorials and op-eds of the day from your blog or Web page. Adjustable-rate, subprime and other mortgages were packed into mortgage-backed securities of great complexity. Rating agencies underestimated the risk of these securities, either because of a lack of competition, poor accountability, or most likely the inherent difficulty in assessing risk due to the complexity. Other government actions were at play: The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were encouraged to expand and buy mortgage-backed securities, including those formed with the risky subprime mortgages. Government action also helped prolong the crisis. Consider that the financial crisis became acute on Aug. 9 and 10, 2007, when money-market interest rates rose dramatically. Interest rate spreads, such as the difference between three-month and overnight interbank loans, jumped to unprecedented levels. Diagnosing the reason for this sudden increase was essential for determining what type of policy response was appropriate. If liquidity was the problem, then providing more liquidity by making borrowing easier at the Federal Reserve discount window, or opening new windows or facilities, would be appropriate. But if counterparty risk was behind the sudden rise in money-market interest rates, then a direct focus on the quality and transparency of the bank's balance sheets would be appropriate. Early on, policy makers misdiagnosed the crisis as one of liquidity, and prescribed the wrong treatment. To provide more liquidity, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. Its main aim was to reduce interest rate spreads in the money markets and increase the flow of credit. But the TAF did not seem to make much difference. If the reason for the spread was counterparty risk as distinct from liquidity, this is not surprising. Another early policy response was the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, passed in February. The major part of this package was to send cash totaling over $100 billion to individuals and families so they would have more to spend and thus jump-start consumption and the economy. But people spent little if anything of the temporary rebate (as predicted by Milton Friedman's permanent income theory, which holds that temporary as distinct from permanent increases in income do not lead to significant increases in consumption). Consumption was not jump-started. A third policy response was the very sharp reduction in the target federal-funds rate to 2% in April 2008 from 5.25% in August 2007. This was sharper than monetary guidelines such as my own Taylor Rule would prescribe. The most noticeable effect of this rate cut was a sharp depreciation of the dollar and a large increase in oil prices. After the start of the crisis, oil prices doubled to over $140 in July 2008, before plummeting back down as expectations of world economic growth declined. But by then the damage of the high oil prices had been done. After a year of such mistaken prescriptions, the crisis suddenly worsened in September and October 2008. We experienced a serious credit crunch, seriously weakening an economy already suffering from the lingering impact of the oil price hike and housing bust. Many have argued that the reason for this bad turn was the government's decision not to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers over the weekend of Sept. 13 and 14. A study of this event suggests that the answer is more complicated and lay elsewhere. While interest rate spreads increased slightly on Monday, Sept. 15, they stayed in the range observed during the previous year, and remained in that range through the rest of the week. On Friday, Sept. 19, the Treasury announced a rescue package, though not its size or the details. Over the weekend the package was put together, and on Tuesday, Sept. 23, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson testified before the Senate Banking Committee. They introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), saying that it would be $700 billion in size. A short draft of legislation was provided, with no mention of oversight and few restrictions on the use of the funds. The two men were questioned intensely and the reaction was quite negative, judging by the large volume of critical mail received by many members of Congress. It was following this testimony that one really begins to see the crisis deepening and interest rate spreads widening. The realization by the public that the government's intervention plan had not been fully thought through, and the official story that the economy was tanking, likely led to the panic seen in the next few weeks. And this was likely amplified by the ad hoc decisions to support some financial institutions and not others and unclear, seemingly fear-based explanations of programs to address the crisis. What was the rationale for intervening with Bear Stearns, then not with Lehman, and then again with AIG? What would guide the operations of the TARP? It did not have to be this way. To prevent misguided actions in the future, it is urgent that we return to sound principles of monetary policy, basing government interventions on clearly stated diagnoses and predictable frameworks for government actions. Massive responses with little explanation will probably make things worse. That is the lesson from this crisis so far. Mr. Taylor, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of "Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis," published later this month by Hoover Press.-- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123414310280561945.html#printMode

Você sabia?

Uma curta video apresentação sobre o mundo de hoje e a tecnologia moderna: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cL9Wu2kWwSY&eurl=http://whatreallyhappened.com/&feature=player_embedded