Economia Internacional - tarifas

The Economist sobre a nova tendencia de impor tarifas sobre o comércio: "... Governments using tariffs as trade weapons now have to calculate the consequences far more carefully. This is borne out, for example, by Mexico’s response this month to the suspension by America of a NAFTA programme that allowed some Mexican truckers to carry goods north of the border. Mexico raised some tariffs, but by less than NAFTA rules allowed, and chose the goods carefully in order to limit the damage to its own industries. Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence that developing countries, at least, continue to use tariffs extensively. In the World Bank’s study, tariff increases accounted for half of the protective measures by these countries. Ecuador raised duties on 600 goods. Russia increased them on used cars. India put them up on some kinds of steel. Developing countries have more scope for raising tariffs without breaking WTO rules than richer ones do, because the gap between their applied rates and the ceilings they agreed to is greater than for developed countries. When governments do impose tariffs, vertical supply chains amplify their effects. Because tariffs are typically levied on the gross value crossing the border (with some exceptions, such as exports from Mexican maquiladoras), trade responds more to changes in tariffs—down or up—with global supply chains than without. But there is another, more subtle reason to worry about even small rises in tariffs. Theoretical models that incorporate vertical specialisation find that it takes off only when tariffs fall below a threshold level. Once this happens, however, trade explodes, so that a slight lowering of trade barriers can cause a huge increase in trade. By the same token, if tariffs rose above a certain point—which might be below the maximum agreed on at the WTO—global supply chains would disintegrate. Trade would drop even more steeply than it has in recent months. That said, supply chains need not snap so easily. Even if tariffs go up, other costs that determine the viability of supply chains may go down: the price of oil (and hence the cost of transport) has fallen a long way in the past year. Firms have invested a lot in their supply chains and will be loth to abandon them. And if global supply chains do survive, vertical specialisation could help trade recover speedily when demand returns. Although increased tariffs are a cause for concern, they are far from the only form of protection being used in this crisis. Two-thirds of the trade-restricting measures documented by the World Bank are non-tariff barriers of various kinds. As with tariffs, developing countries are the principal wielders of these weapons. Indonesia has specified that certain categories of goods, such as clothes, shoes and toys, may be imported through only five ports. Argentina has imposed discretionary licensing requirements on car parts, textiles, televisions, toys, shoes and leather goods; licences for all these used to be granted automatically. Some countries have imposed outright import bans, often justified by a tightening of safety rules or by environmental concerns. For example, China has stopped imports of a wide range of European food and drink, including Irish pork, Italian brandy and Spanish dairy products. The Indian government has banned Chinese toys. In addition, anti-dumping is on the increase. The number of anti-dumping cases initiated at the WTO had been declining, but it started to pick up in the second half of 2007. The data for 2008 are not yet complete but Chad Brown, an economist at Brandeis University, estimates that the number was 31% higher than in the previous year. The number of cases ending with extra duties went up by 20%. India was the biggest initiator of anti-dumping action, and America and the European Union imposed duties most frequently. Rich countries’ weapon of choice so far is neither tariffs nor non-tariff barriers to imports. They have been keen users instead of subsidies to troubled domestic industries, particularly carmakers. Some economists, such as Gene Grossman, of Princeton University, cite this as evidence that global sourcing has changed the political economy of protection. The American automotive industry no longer lobbies for direct protection, as it used to, because it imports much of its value-added and competes with foreign firms that assemble their cars in America. Carmakers now prefer explicit subsidies, and the world is replete with examples. Besides America, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden have all also provided direct or indirect subsidies to carmakers. The World Bank reckons that proposed subsidies for the car industry amount to $48 billion. Nearly 90% of this is in rich countries, where it can easily be slipped into budgetary packages to stimulate demand. The worry about such subsidies is that they could cause production to switch from more efficient plants (eg, in central and eastern Europe) to less efficient ones in rich countries with deep pockets (eg, in western Europe). Whether the location of output is shifting is not yet clear, but politicians plainly hope it will. On March 19th Luc Chatel, the French industry minister, boasted that Renault’s plans to create 400 jobs at a factory near Paris by “repatriating” some production from Slovenia was the result of government aid. Renault has denied this, saying that it was at full capacity in Slovenia..." Leia mais: http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13362027

Economia Internacional: Novos aspectos

The Economist: "... Kei-Mu Yi, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, argues that trade has fallen so fast and so uniformly around the world largely because of the rise of “vertical specialisation”, or global supply chains. This contributed to trade’s rapid expansion in recent decades. Now it is adding to the rate of shrinkage. When David Ricardo argued in the early 19th century that comparative advantage was the basis of trade, he conceived of countries specialising in products, like wine or cloth. But Mr Yi points out that countries now specialise not so much in final products as in steps in the process of production. Trade grows much faster in a world with global sourcing than in a world of trade in finished goods because components and part-finished items have to cross borders several times. The trade figures are also boosted by the practice of measuring the gross value of imports and exports rather than their net value. For example, a tractor made in America would once have been made from American steel and parts; it would have touched the trade data only if it was exported. Now, it may contain steel from India, and be stamped and pressed in Mexico, before being sold abroad. As a result, changes in demand in one country now affect not just the domestic economy but also the trade flows and economies of several countries. This mechanism can be seen at work in recent data—for instance, says Mr Yi, in American automotive-trade figures for the last three months of 2008. Imports from everywhere fell by about 20%. On the export side, sales to America’s partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) fell by 20% whereas those to non-NAFTA countries rose slightly. This, he argues, is because three-quarters of exports to non-NAFTA countries consist of finished vehicles, whereas 60% of exports to NAFTA partners consist of parts and components, most of which return to the United States embodied in imported vehicles. So American exports to other NAFTA countries are to a large extent determined by America’s own demand for cars. By making trade flows more sensitive to falls in output, vertical specialisation may provide some insurance against widespread protectionism. Manufacturers that rely on imported inputs may resist higher tariffs because they push up the prices of those inputs, making domestic industry less competitive..." http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13362027

Economia Internacional - comércio exterior

Variação de valor de exportações de bens dos países de G20. Variação porcentual Janeiro 2009 em relação com Janeiro 2008:

Economia Internacional - colapso do comércio

A crise global se mostra no colapso do comércio exterior mundial.

GDP = PIB

Trade = Comércio exterior

Variação porcentual por ano

Fracasso da teoria econômica padrão (mainstream)

The End of Mainstream Economics March 25, 2009 2:51 PM by Joseph Salerno This transcript is a translation of the first part of Egill Helgason's interview of Gunnar Tómasson, a former IMF economist, on Icelandic state television's "Silfur Egils" on February 1, 2009. (The video is available on YouTube.) Although Tómasson does not identify himself as an Austrian, the interview is wonderful and comes down on the right side of almost every issue. He names names and blames both Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman for the positivist and mathematical orientation of mainstream economic theory, which he argues is the underlying cause of the current breakdown of the global monetary and financial order. FULL TRANSCRIPT

Macro & Ec. Internacional

Porque tenho uma palestra com SEBRAE em Porto Alegre, não temos aula a quarta e quinta, dia 1. e 2. de abril. Vamos ter aula na segunda e na terça (30.3. e 31.3) na semana que vem.

PEQUIM, China, 24 Mar 2009 (AFP) - A China propõe no site do Banco Central do país a criação de uma "moeda de reserva internacional estável" para substituir o dólar, por considerar que a crise financeira exige "uma reforma criativa do sistema monetário internacional". A uma semana da reunião do G-20 em Londres, o presidente do BC chinês, Zhou Xiaochuan, afirma que a crise mostrou "as fragilidades inerentes do atual sistema monetário internacional". ... A China também manifestou a necessidade de uma moeda de reserva internacional "independente das nações individuais", de sua situação nacional, e "capaz de manter-se estável a longo prazo".Grande parte das reservas cambiais chinesas são em dólares e Pequim já expressou diversas vezes preocupação com o futuro das mesmas."A criação de uma nova moeda de reserva amplamente aceita poderia levar algum tempo", reconheceu Zhou, que sugeriu que os Direitos de Emissão Especiais possam ter o papel de "moeda de reserva supranacional".Estes Direitos, que têm o valor atrelado a uma cesta de moedas, foram criados pelo Fundo Monetário Mundial (FMI) em 1969 como uma reserva mundial para completar as reservas dos países membros quando a oferta de ouro e dólares não era suficiente.A reforma do sistema financeiro mundial centrará as discussões do G-20 no dia 2 de abril em Londres." http://economia.uol.com.br/ultnot/afp/2009/03/24/ult35u68457.jhtm

Política econômica

Seis lições sobre a política econômica de Ludwig von Mises Link

Brasil gastou menos em pacotes anticrise

Folha Online da Efe, em Genebra

O Brasil foi o país que teve em 2008 o menor gasto relativo entre as nações que apresentaram medidas anticrise, informou nesta terça-feira a OIT (Organização Internacional do Trabalho) em relatório que será entregue aos países do G20 (grupo dos países ricos e dos principais emergentes) para servir de subsídio para a reunião de cúpula no início de abril, em Londres.

Segundo a organização, no ano passado o Brasil gastou o equivalente a 0,2% do PIB (Produto Interno Bruto) em medidas para reduzir o impacto da crise financeira global. Foi o pior desempenho entre os 32 países que também anunciaram recursos...--

Macro: nova publicação brasileira

Renda, Consumo e Crescimento Gilberto Dupas 1a. edição, 2004 De R$ 29,90 por R$ 8,99 Para comprar pelo telefone ligue para 0800 140090

Volume da série Biblioteca Valor , "Renda, Consumo e Crescimento" analisa o período pós-estabilização do Plano Real (1995-2002), apontando seus efeitos positivos e negativos, bem como as possíveis soluções para esses impasses. A obra é fruto de pesquisa realizada no Instituto de Estudos Econômicos e Internacionais (IEEI), de São Paulo, com o apoio do Instituto Roberto Simonsen - Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (IRS -Fiesp).

Título: Renda, Consumo e Crescimento Autor: Gilberto Dupas Editora: Publifolha Edição: 1a. edição, 2004 Idioma: Português Número de páginas: 112 páginas Formato: 12,9 cm x 19,8 cm (largura x altura) Especificação: Offset 90 g/m², 1 x 1 cor, Brochura Peso: 150 gramas ISBN: 85-7402-548-8 Área: Biblioteca Valor

O declínio Americano

Justin Raimondo explica as causas do declínio do imperio Americano: "I am not cheered by the subject of my talk here today, which is the decline and fall of the American empire, first, because I am an American, and, second, because the description of America as an empire fits it all too well. When you remember that the American Revolution was fought against an imperial power, that the U.S. was born in a struggle against an occupying army, and that its victory against the British was an inspiration to anti-imperialist liberals everywhere, it is a shaming thing to have to come here to describe how it ended in tragedy, betrayal, and a short and ugly decline..." Leia mais

Macroeconomia Slides do livro de texto de Blanchard

Blanchard Macroeconomia Slides Cap 10 Cap 11 Cap 12 Cap 13 http://continentaleconomics.com/AudioLectures.html

Recursos para Macro e Economia Internacional

Podcasts e slides: http://continentaleconomics.com/AudioLectures.html

A origem monetária da crise

Michael S. Rozeff explica: "The world economy is experiencing a severe recession or depression. This has been preceded by a steep inflation in nominal stocks of money across the entire world. Central banks control these money stocks or money supplies. They engineered a global credit boom by inflating their local currencies..." Text completo: http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff282.html

Economia Internacional: slides

Para a próxima parte da teoria de comércio tratando "a nova teoria de comércio" usamos os slides de Paul Kugman de sua palestra Nobel. Download aqui: New Trade Theory Mais recursos: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2008/krugman-lecture.html

Diferenças dentro do Salão Oval Pablo Martinez/AP Os presidentesObama e Lula: gracejos, piadas e sapatos brilhantes No primeiro encontro de Lula e Obama, apareceram diferenças entre os dois presidentes, quando deram entrevista no Salão Oval da Casa Branca. Eis algumas: • Enquanto Lula fala, Obama olha-o fixamente. Quando Obama fala, Lula olha para o teto, a plateia, o chão, o tradutor – para qualquer coisa, menos para o interlocutor. • Obama entende algumas palavras em português, anuindo com a cabeça antes que o tradutor entre em ação. Ou finge entender. Lula não pesca nada de inglês. Ou finge não pescar. • Lula e Obama gostam de descontrair o ambiente. Lula expressa sua informalidade em gracejos e piadas. Obama acompanha, mas sua descontração está na linguagem corporal. • Atenção, atenção, itamaratecas de punhos de renda: os sapatos pretos de Obama brilhavam mais que os sapatos pretos de Lula. http://veja.abril.com.br/idade/exclusivo/250309/radar.shtml

O Reino Unido: Destruido pela teoria de Keynes

Do "The Economist": This valedictory despatch by Sir Nicholas Henderson was written as he retired from the foreign service a few weeks ago having served successively as Britain's ambassador in Bonn and Paris. Sir Nicholas has subsequently been brought out of retirement to become ambassador in Washington. The despatch does not, needless to say, reach us from him and was presumably written for very limited circulation. But it is so unusually forthright and timely, particularly in its middle and concluding passages on British policy in Europe, under governments of every stripe, as to merit publication virtually in full. -- Leia a análise de Henderson: O declínio de Britannia http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13315108&source=hptextfeature

A formula que destruo Wall Street

"... A year ago, it was hardly unthinkable that a math wizard like David X. Li might someday earn a Nobel Prize. After all, financial economists—even Wall Street quants—have received the Nobel in economics before, and Li's work on measuring risk has had more impact, more quickly, than previous Nobel Prize-winning contributions to the field. Today, though, as dazed bankers, politicians, regulators, and investors survey the wreckage of the biggest financial meltdown since the Great Depression, Li is probably thankful he still has a job in finance at all. Not that his achievement should be dismissed. He took a notoriously tough nut—determining correlation, or how seemingly disparate events are related—and cracked it wide open with a simple and elegant mathematical formula, one that would become ubiquitous in finance worldwide. For five years, Li's formula, known as a Gaussian copula function, looked like an unambiguously positive breakthrough, a piece of financial technology that allowed hugely complex risks to be modeled with more ease and accuracy than ever before. With his brilliant spark of mathematical legerdemain, Li made it possible for traders to sell vast quantities of new securities, expanding financial markets to unimaginable levels. His method was adopted by everybody from bond investors and Wall Street banks to ratings agencies and regulators. And it became so deeply entrenched—and was making people so much money—that warnings about its limitations were largely ignored. Then the model fell apart. Cracks started appearing early on, when financial markets began behaving in ways that users of Li's formula hadn't expected. The cracks became full-fledged canyons in 2008—when ruptures in the financial system's foundation swallowed up trillions of dollars and put the survival of the global banking system in serious peril..." -- Texto completo: http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wp_quant

Bailout - quem recebe "ajuda"?

Matt Tibbi: "... There are plenty of people who have noticed, in recent years, that when they lost their homes to foreclosure or were forced into bankruptcy because of crippling credit-card debt, no one in the government was there to rescue them. But when Goldman Sachs — a company whose average employee still made more than $350,000 last year, even in the midst of a depression — was suddenly faced with the possibility of losing money on the unregulated insurance deals it bought for its insane housing bets, the government was there in an instant to patch the hole. That's the essence of the bailout: rich bankers bailing out rich bankers, using the taxpayers' credit card..." http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/26793903/the_big_takeover/print

The Bailout Reader

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Freddie Mac: A Mercantilist Enterprise, by Paul Cleveland, March 14, 2005 Fannie Mae: Another New Deal Monstrosity, by Karen De Coster, July 2, 2007 How Fannie and Freddie Made Me a Grumpy Economist, by Christopher Westley, July 21, 2008 Who Made the Fannie and Freddie Threat? By Frank Shostak, March 5, 2004 Are Fannie and Freddie Too Big to Fail? By Frank Shostak, September 17, 2008 Fannie Mae Distorts Markets, by Robert Blumen, June 17, 2002 The Housing Bubble The Housing Bubble in Four Easy Steps, by Mark Thornton, September 27, 2008 The Economics of Housing Bubbles, by Mark Thornton, June 6, 2006 The Real Cost of a Full Bailout, by Don Rich, August 22, 2008 The Subprime Mortgage "Crisis" Will Fix Itself, by Steve Berger, May 30, 2007 Did the Fed Cause the Housing Bubble? By Robert Murphy, April 14, 2008 The Mortgage Market Mess, by Christopher Westley, May 17, 2007 Housing Bubble: Myth or Reality? By Frank Shostak, March 4, 2003 Inflationary Finance Confidence Is Leaving the Fiat Money System, by Thorsten Polleit, October 10, 2008 What's Behind the Financial Market Crisis? by Antony Mueller, September 18, 2008 Our Financial House of Cards, by George Reisman, March 25, 2008 Will Central Bankers Become Central Planners? by Robert Blumen, July 31, 2008 Inflation is a Policy that Cannot Last, by Thorsten Polleit, March 14, 2008 The Widening Safety Net, by Christopher Mayer, March 19, 2004 The Fed's New Tricks Are Creating Disaster, Frank Shostak, March 18, 2008 The Fed's War on the Middle Class, by Mark Thornton, June 4, 2008. The Cultural and Spiritual Legacy of Fiat Inflation, by Jorg Guido Hulsmann, July 28, 2008. Stones into Bread, by Ludwig von Mises. Austrian Economics and Financial Markets conference at The Venetian Hotel Resort Casino, Las Vegas, 02-18-2005 Community Reinvestment Act The CRA Scam and its Defenders, by Thomas DiLorenzo, April 30, 2008 Regulatory Sneak Attack, by Thomas DiLorenzo, September 16, 1999 Short Selling The SEC Short Sells Us Down the River, by Art Carden and Robert Murphy, October 9, 2008 Short-Sale Restrictions Are an Exercise in Naked Power, by Robert Murphy, August 11, 2008 The Social Function of Futures Markets, by Robert Murphy, November 29, 2006 Don't Sell Short Selling Short, by Gary Galles, April 6, 2007 The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle Financial Crisis and Recession, by Jesus Huerta de Soto, October 6, 2008 The Idiocy of Wall Street, by Don Rich, September 24, 2008 The Fed is Culpable, by Hans F. Sennholz, November 11, 2002 Skyscrapers and Business Cycles, by Mark Thornton, August 23, 2008 Economic Outlook 2008: Darkening Clouds, Dominick Armentano, January 2, 2008 Business Cycle Primer, Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. February 8, 2001 Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure, by Murray Rothbard Who Predicted This? The Financial Apocalyptics are Back, Robert Blumen, July 25, 2007 Sowing the Seeds of the Next Crisis, Thorsten Polleit, April 25, 2006 Credit Crisis: Precursor of Great Inflation, by Thorsten Polleit, February 7, 2008 Mr. Bailout, by Antony Mueller, September 30, 2004 America's Unsustainable Boom, by Stefan Karlsson, November 8, 2004 Who Predicted the Bubble? Who Predicted the Crash? By Mark Thornton, July 14, 2003 What To Do The Rescue Package Will Delay Recovery, September 29, 2008 Don't Bail Them Out, by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., September 10, 2008 How to Avoid Another Depression, by Mark Thornton, September 10, 2008 Taking Money Back, By Murray N. Rothbard, June 14, 2008 Beware the Alchemists, by Ludwig von Mises, February 3, 2006 Reflation in American History, by H.A. Scott Trask, October 31, 2003 Money and Freedom, by Joseph Salerno, February 2, 2002 The Case for a Genuine Gold Dollar, by Murray Rothbard Interview with Frank Shostak, September 30, 2008 The Myth that Laissez-Faire is Responsible for the Economic Crisis, George Reisman, October 23, 2008 Books to Distribute The Theory of Money and Credit, by Ludwig von Mises America's Great Depression, by Murray Rothbard The Mystery of Banking, by Murray Rothbard Prices and Production, by F.A. Hayek Causes of the Economic Crisis, by Ludwig von Mises Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle and Other Essays, by Ludwig von Mises, et al. Understanding the Dollar Crisis, by Percy Greaves The Case Against the Fed, by Murray Rothbard Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, by Jesus Huerta de Soto History of American Currency, by William Graham Sumner Banking and the Business Cycle, by C.A. Phillips The Roosevelt Myth, by John T. Flynn Fiat Money Inflation in France, by Andrew Dickson White http://mises.org/story/3128 1 - 10 of 911,000 for "The Bailout Reader" (About)

"Meltdown" - Tom Woods explica a crise

Meltdown’ Blames Feds for the Crashby Declan McCullagh (CBS) Not only is our current recession unusually deep and severe, but it’s about to become the longest since the Great Depression. Housing prices are crashing, stocks have fallen into a deep bear market, and the only things up besides unemployment are the sale of ammunition and AR-15 rifles. Figuring out how we’ve reached this point is not easy. One choice is to blame laissez-faire policies, an argument that’s been invoked by everyone from notoriously pessimistic economist Nouriel Roubini and reporters at the New York Times to French President Nicolas Sarkozy. On the other hand, the number of pages of federal regulations has swelled, not shrunk, over the last decade. The number of employees at the relevant agencies (SEC, FDIC, FINRA, OCC, NCUA, FFIEC, OTS, FHRA, and the FRB) has continued to grow. It was regulatory failure, not market failure, that gave us the spectacles of Darrel Dochow, Bernie Madoff, and taxpayer-funded bonuses at AIG. Another explanation is that unfettered greed, especially on the part of Wall Street and mortgage lenders, is the culprit. But human greed and avarice are not unique to the last decade, when housing prices skyrocketed beyond what fundamentals permit, making that explanation less satisfying than it should be. A new book by Thomas Woods called Meltdown (Regnery Publishing, 2009) provides a more fulfilling account of what went wrong, why it happened, and who’s to blame. Woods holds a doctorate in history from Columbia University and is the author of the bestselling, iconoclastic The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Woods’ latest book makes a strong argument for laying the blame squarely on the shoulders of Washington politicians and regulators. One chapter is titled “How Government Created the Housing Bubble,” and points to special privileges granted to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a federal law allowing tax-free capital gains, and the Community Reinvestment Act’s incentives for banks to make bad loans. The ultimate culprit, in Woods’ view, is the Federal Reserve. In 2001, he writes, “Fed chairman Alan Greenspan sought to reignite the economy through a series of rate cuts… the new money and credit overwhelmingly found its way into the housing market, where artificially lax lending standards made excessive home purchases and speculation in homes seem to many Americans like good financial moves.” This is not a unique criticism. Many economists, including Stanford University’s John Taylor, have charged that the Federal Reserve kept interest rates artificially low and that the housing boom and bust could have been avoided with more prudent government policies. At a congressional hearing last fall, some Democratic politicians made similar allegations. (For his part, former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan responded in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article last week titled “The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble.”) Woods is a senior fellow at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Ala., a non-profit group devoted to libertarian scholarship and championing what’s known as Austrian business cycle theory. The idea is that a central bank’s low interest rates expand the money supply, therefore creating malinvestments (because, say, real estate or dot-com entrepreneurs believe there’s immense demand for what they have to offer), an unsustainable boom, and an eventual correction. Nobel laureate F.A. Hayek, a leading proponent of that theory, was a founding board member of the institute. The Austrian explanation remains a minority one among economists — Times columnist Paul Krugman likened it to the “phlogiston theory of fire,” and the late Milton Friedman claimed it has done “a great deal of harm.” Woods’ solutions to today’s economic woes are the opposite of the U.S. government’s (or Krugman’s) approach: he would let firms go bankrupt, ditch Fannie and Freddie, halt bailouts, and question whether the Federal Reserve even needs to exist. Woods says Austrian theory is worth studying because it correctly predicted what’s happening today. “It’s about time we listened instead to people who have a coherent theory to explain why these crises occur, saw this crisis coming, and have something to suggest other than juvenile fantasies about spending and inflating our way to prosperity,” he writes, perhaps a little too optimistically given the current political climate in Washington. Woods’ work — the complete title is Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse — is in the vanguard of the first wave of books dissecting the Crash of 2008. (Rep. Ron Paul, the Texas Republican and former presidential candidate, said in a foreword that “there is no better book to read on the present crisis than this one.”) See Full text Go to Tom Woods’ website

EU - trilhões de dólares deficits orçamentais por anos

WASHINGTON – President Barack Obama's budget would generate deficits averaging almost $1 trillion a year over the next decade, according to the latest congressional estimates, significantly worse than predicted by the White House just last month. The Congressional Budget Office figures, obtained by The Associated Press Friday, predict Obama's budget will produce $9.3 trillion worth of red ink over 2010-2019. That's $2.3 trillion worse than the White House predicted in its budget. Worst of all, CBO says the deficit under Obama's policies would never go below 4 percent of the size of the economy, figures that economists agree are unsustainable. By the end of the decade, the deficit would exceed 5 percent of gross domestic product, a dangerously high level. --- http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090320/ap_on_go_pr_wh/obama_budget

A bolsa americana vista de Europa

O Índice Standard & Poor's 500 deflacionado por o índice de preço e corrigido por a taxa de câmbio do dólar (em relação do marco alemão e desde 1999 do Euro).

Resultado: Em Fevereiro 2009 o valor do índice voltou por o mesmo nível como em Junho de 1964.

A Ponzi economia dos Estados Unidos

Nouriel Roubini: The United States Of Ponzi "... A reporter contacted me recently with the following question: "I am a reporter, and I am doing a story on Bernard Madoff's life after pleading guilty. As part of this, I was wondering if you could comment on what significance he will have in the history of this period. Will he represent more than a scamster who stole a lot of money from a lot of people? As Bernie Ebbers and Ken Lay came to embody corporate greed and deceit, what will Madoff symbolize?" Here is my answer fleshed out in full: Americans lived in a "Made-off" and Ponzi bubble economy for a decade or even longer. Madoff is the mirror of the American economy and of its over-leveraged agents: a house of cards of leverage over leverage by households, financial firms and corporations that has now collapsed in a heap. When you put zero down on your home, and you thus have no equity in your home, your leverage is literally infinite and you are playing a Ponzi game. And the bank that lent you, with zero down, a NINJA (no income, no jobs and assets) liar loan that was interest-only for a while, with negative amortization and an initial teaser rate, was also playing a Ponzi game. And private equity firms that did over a $1 trillion of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the last few years with a debt-to-earnings ratio of 10 or above were also Ponzi firms playing a Ponzi game. A government that will issue trillions of dollars of new debt to pay for this severe recession and socialize private losses may risk becoming a Ponzi government if--in the medium term--it does not return to fiscal discipline and debt sustainability. A country that has--for over 25 years--spent more than income and thus run an endless string of current account deficit--and has thus become the largest net foreign debtor in the world (with net foreign liabilities that are likely to be over $3 trillion by the end of this year)--is also a Ponzi country that may eventually default on its foreign debt if it does not, over time, tighten its belt and start running smaller current account deficits and actual trade surpluses. Whenever you persistently consume more than your income year after year (a household with negative savings, a government with budget deficit, a firm or financial institution with persistent losses, a country with a current account deficit) you are playing a Ponzi game. In the jargon of formal economics, you are not satisfying your long-run inter-temporal budget constraint as you borrow to finance the interest rate on your previous debt, and are thus following an unsustainable debt dynamics that eventually leads to outright insolvency..." Texto completo: http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/18/american-economy-housing-bubble-madoff-opinions-columnists-ponzi_print.html

Fim do papel do dólar como moeda de reserva global

LUXEMBOURG (Reuters) - A U.N. panel will next week recommend that the world ditch the dollar as its reserve currency in favor of a shared basket of currencies, a member of the panel said on Wednesday, adding to pressure on the dollar...-- http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52H2CY20090318

A origem da crise

Os autores do segunte artigo analisam o papel da teoria de gestão como causa da crise e negam que boni e "shareholder value" sejam culpables: "... Is management theory to blame for the current crisis in the world economy? Some commentators think that business schools' focus on shareholder wealth maximization, performance-based pay, and the virtue of self-interest have led banks, corporations, and governments astray. Hefty bonuses promoted excessive risk-taking, and the free-market philosophy taught in business schools removed the final ethical checks and balances on such behavior. "It is the type of thinking," worry Raymond Fisman and Rakesh Khurana in Forbes (December 12, 2008), "that is now bringing capitalism to its knees..." Leia mais:

O que acontece sem bailouts do governo?

NEW YORK (AP) -- What if the government got out of the bailout business?

Análise Macroeconômica III - EMENTA

303154 – Análise Macroeconômica III CR: 04 c.H. 60 P.E.L. 4.00.0 Pré-Requisito: 303155 EMENTA: Teorias do crescimento econômico. Crises econômicas, monetárias e financeiras. Política fiscal e monetária e suas limitações. Análise de problemas macroeconômicas da atualidade. Debates da macroeconomia. AVALIAÇÂO: Três provas (Abril, Maio, Junho), um trabalho (3-5 pp.), participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas. METODO: 1. Método: expositivo-dialógico 2. Procedimentos didáticos: - Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula - Apresentação de trabalhos de pesquisa e reflexão - Exercícios analíticos - Leituras reflexivas - Analise de exemplos - Discussão de temas de atualidade BIBLIOGRAFIA Livro de texto padrão: Olivier Blanchard: Macroeconomia. Pearson Education do Brasil. 4ª edição 2007 Cap.: 10-13; 22-23; 24-27 N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomia. Editora LTC. 1998 SITE: http://www.economianova.blogspot.com/ BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR: 1. Textos básicos Ackley, Gardner( 1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira, Vol 1, cap. I e II. Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 1, 2 e 30. Byrns, Ralph T. & Stone, Gerald W(1 995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron Books. cap. 1 a 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hjll cap. 1 e 18. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 1 e 2. Lima, Gilberto Tadeu(1 992).Em Busca do Tempo Perdido: A Recuperação Pós - Keynesiana da Economia do Emprego de Keynes. Rio de Janeiro, BNDES, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas. Vol. 1, cap. 1 e 7.. Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P( 1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 1 a 3. 2. Fundamentos da Macroeconomia Clássica e Keynesiana Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira. cap. V. Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 e 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 2. Leite, José Alfredo A( 1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 2. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 18 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 3. Modelos de Equilíbrio Agregativo de Curto Prazo Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira.cap. XXIII a XV. Blanchard, Olivier(1999 )Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 a 6. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron, cap. 3 a 5 e 10 a 12 Gordon, Robert J(1 990),Macroeconomics. Illinois,Scott,Foresman and Company, cap. 3 a 5. Sachs, Jefrey D. & Larrain, B.Felipe(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro,Makron Books, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976)Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 19 e 20 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 6 a 8. 4. Expectativas e o Modelo Macroeconômico da IS -LM Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 7 a 10. Davidson, Paul(1994).Post-Keynesian Macroeconomic. Cambridge, Edward Elgar. cap. 8 e 12. 5. Modelo Keynesiano Generalizado Numa Economia Aberta Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 6 e 20. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 9 e 11. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 13. Símonsen, Mario H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 8. 6. Oferta Agregada e Mercado de Trabalho Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 13. Leite, José Alfredo A(1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 11 e 12. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 11. 7.Equilíbrio Geral de Todos os Mercados AgregadosBlanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 7. 8. Produto, Inflação e Desemprego Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 14 a 17. CONHECIMENTOS PREREQUISITOS Modelos 1. Cruz keynesiana 2. ISLM 3. Curva de Phillips 4. Curva de Phillips com expectativas 5. ISLMBP 6. Modelo monetarista 7. Expectativas racionais 8. Oferta e demanda agregada 9. Modelo de metas da inflação (Taylor rule) 10. Contabilidade social 11. Contabilidade de crescimento (growth accounting)

Macro III Bibliografia complementar

BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR: 1. Textos básicos Ackley, Gardner( 1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira, Vol 1, cap. I e II. Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 1, 2 e 30. Byrns, Ralph T. & Stone, Gerald W(1 995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron Books. cap. 1 a 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hjll cap. 1 e 18. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 1 e 2. Lima, Gilberto Tadeu(1 992).Em Busca do Tempo Perdido: A Recuperação Pós - Keynesiana da Economia do Emprego de Keynes. Rio de Janeiro, BNDES, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas. Vol. 1, cap. 1 e 7.. Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P( 1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 1 a 3. 2. Fundamentos da Macroeconomia Clássica e Keynesiana Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira. cap. V. Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 e 4. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 2. Leite, José Alfredo A( 1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 2. Shapiro, Edward(1976). Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 18 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 3. Modelos de Equilíbrio Agregativo de Curto Prazo Ackley, Gardner(1978). Teoria Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Pioneira.cap. XXIII a XV. Blanchard, Olivier(1999 )Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 3 a 6. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron, cap. 3 a 5 e 10 a 12 Gordon, Robert J(1 990),Macroeconomics. Illinois,Scott,Foresman and Company, cap. 3 a 5. Sachs, Jefrey D. & Larrain, B.Felipe(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro,Makron Books, cap.3. Shapiro, Edward(1976)Análise Macroeconômica. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 19 e 20 Simonse, Mano H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 6 a 8. 4. Expectativas e o Modelo Macroeconômico da IS -LM Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 7 a 10. Davidson, Paul(1994).Post-Keynesian Macroeconomic. Cambridge, Edward Elgar. cap. 8 e 12. 5. Modelo Keynesiano Generalizado Numa Economia Aberta Blanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 6 e 20. Hall, Robert E. & Taylor, John B(1989). Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus. cap. 9 e 11. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 13. Símonse, Mario H & Cysne, Rubens P(1995). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Atlas, cap. 8. 6. Oferta Agregada e Mercado de Trabalho Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 13. Leite, José Alfredo A(1994). Macroeconomia.. São Paulo, Atlas. cap. 11 e 12. Mankiw, N.Gregory(1995)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Livros Técnicos e Científicos. cap. 11. 7.Equilíbrio Geral de Todos os Mercados AgregadosBlanchard, Olivier(1999)Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(1991). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 7. 8. Produto, Inflação e Desemprego Blanchard, Olivier(1999).Macroeconomia. Rio de Janeiro, Campus, cap. 11 a 14. Dornbusch, R & Fischer,S(199 1). Macroeconomia. São Paulo, Makron/McGraw-Hill, cap. 14 a 17.

Macro III - Ementa

303154 – Análise Macroeconômica III CR: 04 c.H. 60 P.E.L. 4.00.0 Pré-Requisito: 303155 EMENTA: Teorias do crescimento econômico. Crises econômicas, monetárias e financeiras. Política fiscal e monetária e suas limitações. Análise de problemas macroeconômicas da atualidade. Debates da macroeconomia. AVALIAÇÂO: Três provas (Abril, Maio, Junho), um trabalho (3-5 pp.), participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas. METODO: 1. Método: expositivo-dialógico 2. Procedimentos didáticos: - Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula - Apresentação de trabalhos de pesquisa e reflexão - Exercícios analíticos - Leituras reflexivas - Analise de exemplos - Discussão de temas de atualidade BIBLIOGRAFIA Livro de texto padrão: Olivier Blanchard: Macroeconomia. Pearson Education do Brasil. 4ª edição 2007 Cap.: 10-13; 22-23; 24-27 N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomia. Editora LTC. 1998 SITE: www.economianova.blogspot.com

Modelos e conhecimentos básicos da teoria macroeconômica

1. Cruz keynesiana 2. ISLM 3. Curva de Phillips 4. Curva de Phillips com expectativas 5. ISLMBP 6. Modelo monetarista 7. Expectativas racionais 8. Oferta e demanda agregada 9. Modelo de metas da inflação (Taylor rule) 10. Contabilidade social 11. Contabilidade de crescimento (growth accounting)

Liçoes da estagnação japonesa

Nomura data show com 26 slides sobre a estagnação japonesa. "O tempo da balance sheet recessão - O que pós Estados Unidos, Europa e China podem aprender de Japão 1990-2005" por Richard C. Koo, jefe economista do Instituto de Pesquisa de Nomura: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/081029_japan_koo.pdf Veja tambem: Historia da bolha japonesa http://www.scribd.com/doc/4882505/Japan-Economy-History

De Bush à Obama: O déficit federal

Economia Internacional - Ementa

303182 – Economia Internacional I CR: 04 c.H. 60 P.E.L. 4.00.0 Pré-Requisito: 303181 EMENTA: Origem das teorias do comércio internacional. Vantagens absolutas e vantagens relativas. Modelos e fatores específicos; modelo de Heckscher-Ohlin; modelo padrão de comércio. Política de comercia internacional, economias de escala e concorrência imperfeita, instrumentos e usos da política comercial. Balanço de pagamentos. Determinantes da taxa de câmbio e de fluxos de capital. AVALIAÇÂO: Três provas (Abril, Maio, Junho), um trabalho (3-5 pp.), participação na aula, freqüência de presença nas aulas. METODO: 1. Método: expositivo-dialógico 2. Procedimentos didáticos: - Estudos dirigidos em sala de aula - Apresentação de trabalhos de pesquisa e reflexão - Exercícios analíticos - Leituras reflexivas - Analise de exemplos - Discussão de temas de atualidade BIBLIOGRAFIA Livro de texto padrão: Maria Auxiliadora de Carvalho e César Roberto Leite da Silva: Economia Internacional, Editora Saraiva. 3ª edicião 2006 Paul Krugman e Maurice Obstfeld, Economía Internacional. Teoria e Política. Makron Books SITE: http://www.economianova.blogspot.com/ PODCASTS e DATA SHOWS: http://continentaleconomics.com/AudioLectures.html BIBLIOGRAFIA COMPLEMENTAR: AHEARNE, A., CLINE, W. R., LEE, K. T., PARK, Y.C., PISANI-FERRY, J, WILLIAMSON, J. Global Imbalances: time for action. Policy Brief, 07/4. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.ALESINA, A., BARRO, R. J., TENREYRO, S. (2002). Optimal Currency Areas. Texto disponível em: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/alesina/papers.html.ARIDA, P. (2003). Por uma moeda plenamente conversível. Revista de Economia Política,Vol 23, nº 3, Jul-SetARIDA, P. (2003b). Ainda sobre a conversibilidade. Revista de Economia Política,Vol 23, nº 3, Jul-Set.BACHA, E. Reflexões pós-cepalinas sobre inflação e crise externa. Revista de Economia Política , Vol 23, nº 3, Jul-Set..BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL (2001). Notas Explicativas ao Balanço de Pagamentos Compilado de Acordo com as Normas Estabelecidas na Quinta Edição do Manual de Balanço de Pagamentos do FMI. Disponível em: (www.bcb.gov.br) (texto 1)BAUMANN, R., CANUTO, O., GONÇALVES, R. (2004). Economia Internacional: teoria e experiência brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.BELLUZZO, L. G., CARNEIRO, R. (2004). O Mito da Conversibilidade. Revista de EconomiaPolítica,Vol 24, nº 2, abril-junho.BLANCHARD, O. (2002). Macroeconomia: teoria e política econômica. Rio de Janeiro: Campus.BLOCK, F. L (1977). The Origins of International Economic Disorder. (Las Orígenes del Desorden Económico Internacional, Fondo de Cultura, México, 1980).BRESSER PEREIRA, L.C., NAKANO, Y. (2003). Crescimento econômico com poupança externa?Revista de Economia Política, Vol. 23, nº 2, Abr-Jun . 2003.CARVALHO, M. A., SILVA, C. R. L. (1999). Economia Internacional. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva.CARVALHO, F. J. C., SOUZA, F.E.P., SICSÚ, J., PAULA, L. F. R., STUDART, R. (2007) Economia Monetária e Financeira: teoria e política, 2a. ed.. São Paulo, Campus.DOOLEY, M. P., FOLKERTS-LANDAU, D., GARBER, P (2005). International Financial Stability: Asia, Interest Rates, and the Dolar. (http://econ.ucsc.edu/~mpd/)EICHENGREEN, B. (2003). A Globalização do Capital. São Paulo: Editora 34.FEIJÓ, C. A., RAMOS, R. L. O., YOUNG, C. E. F., LIMA, F. C. G. C., GALVÃO, O., J. A (2001).Contabilidade Social: o novo sistema de contas nacionais do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus.KOSE, M.A., PRASAD, E. (2004). Liberalizing Capital Account Restrictions. Finance and Development, september 2004. Washington, DC: IMF (www.imf.org).KRUGMAN, P., OBSTFELD, M. (2005). Economia Internacional: teoria e política, 6 ed. , Pearson.OREIRO, J.L., DE PAULA, L. F., SILVA, G.J.C. (2004). Por uma Moeda Parcialmente Conversível.Revista de Economia Política,Vol 24, nº 2, abril-junho.PAPADIMITRIOU, D.B., SHAIKH, A., SANTOS, C. H., ZEZZA, G. How Fragile is the U.S. Economy? Strategic Analysis, march. New York: The Levy Economic Institute of Bard College, 2005 (www.levy.org).PAULANI, L., BRAGA, M (2006). A Nova Contabilidade Social. São Paulo, Saraiva.POLANYI, K. (1944). The Great Transformation (tradução para o português da Editora Elsevier, 9ª ed., 2000).PRASAD, E., ROGOFF, K., WEI, S., KOSE, M.A (2003). Effects of Financial Globalization onDeveloping Countries: Some Empirical Evidence. Washington, DC: IMF (www.imf.org).PRATES, D. (2004). A Assimetria das Contas Externas. Política Econômica em Foco, n.4. Campinas: Instituto de Economia da Unicamp (www.eco.unicam.br)PRATES, D. (2006). A inserção externa da economia brasileira no governo Lula. Política Econômica em Foco, n.7. Campinas: Instituto de Economia da Unicamp (www.eco.unicam.br)

Economia Internacional

Por causa de feriado na terça, não temos aula a segunda e por compensação tem a tarefa de fazer as "Questões para revisão" de nosso livro de texto pp. 23 e 24 Na quarta começamos com o capitulo 2 (Teoria da dotação relativa dos factores), pp. 25-43 Por favor preparar a aula e estudar os modelos e conceitos (função de produção, isocusto, curva de indiferença, fronteira de possibilidades de produção). Bom dia de feriado, prof. Antony

Macro III

Nossa próxima aula vai ter lugar na quinta (19/4). Na terça não vai ter aula por causa do dia de feriado. Como preparação estudar capitulo 10 (pp. 187 livro de texto de Blanchard). Em caso não tem conhecimentos sobre o modelo de demanda e oferta agregada (DA/OA), por favor preparar. O livro de texto de Blanchard trata este modelo no capitulo 7 pp. 127).

Racismo nos mercados financeiros?

(AP): The NAACP is accusing Wells Fargo and HSBC of forcing blacks into subprime mortgages while whites with identical qualifications got lower rates. Class-action lawsuits will be filed against the banks Friday in federal court in Los Angeles, Austin Tighe, co-lead counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, told The Associated Press. Black homebuyers have been 3 1/2 times more likely to receive a subprime loan than white borrowers, and six times more likely to get a subprime rate when refinancing, Tighe said. Blacks still were disproportionately steered into subprime loans when their credit scores, income and down payment were equal to those of white homebuyers, he said...-- http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090313/ap_on_re_us/naacp_mortgage_discrimination

Políticas contra a crise

SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Japan and China on Friday backed government spending to fight the global financial crisis, ahead of a G20 meeting at which the United States and Europe are split over the need for more aggressive stimulus measures. Japanese Finance Minister Kaoru Yosano urged world leaders to focus on giving an immediate boost to the global economy and promised to unveil new economic stimulus measures by April. China said it was ready to do more if needed to spur its growth. "The immediate issues are to stabilize the financial system (and) to get out of the present deflation threat facing the world economy," Yosano was quoted as saying in Friday's edition of the Financial Times. "These two are the most important things." Finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of 20 nations will meet near Brighton, England, on Friday and Saturday to discuss a roadmap to tackle the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. G20 leaders meet in London on April 2. The world's top economic powers are under pressure to deliver on pledges made in November, when they outlined an action plan to combat the crisis and guard against future meltdowns. But the run-up to this weekend's gathering has been dominated by disagreements over what the summit's priorities should be, and the degree to which countries should ramp up stimulus spending. Washington is urging the biggest industrialized countries to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product to boost demand and pull the global economy out of its tailspin, but France and Germany have rejected U.S. and British calls for fresh spending. "The international community must unite to tackle the downturn and set the path toward a sustainable future," British finance minister Alistair Darling said on Friday in a column in the Wall Street Journal. "We must do three things: boost demand, reform the global system of financial regulation, and increase the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)." The G20 represents more than 80 percent of the global economy, comprising the Group of Seven industrial nations -- all of which are in or near recession -- and key emerging markets such as Russia, China, India and Brazil. Early in the crisis, major central banks made coordinated rate cuts to spur demand but policy actions have been largely ad hoc since. Many governments announced multiple stimulus packages and massive bank rescue plans only to see their economies sink deeper into recession and their finances fall deeper in debt...-- http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE52A6D620090313?feedType=nl&feedName=usmorningdigest Os Estados Unidos querem mais gastos governamentais e encontram a opposição de França e Alemanha. O grupo de 20 (G20) inclue Brasil e estas vinte economias representam 80 por centos da economia mundial.

Empobrecimento

Familias americanas perdem trilhões em riqueza: WASHINGTON (AP) -- The net worth of American households fell by the largest amount in more than a half-century of record keeping during the fourth quarter of last year, reflecting the blow families are taking from a plunging stock market and dwindling home prices. The Federal Reserve said Thursday that household net worth dropped by a record 9 percent in 2008's October-December period compared to the third quarter. That was the biggest decline on records that go back to 1951. The drop represented a loss of $5.1 trillion in family net worth, leaving the total at $51.48 trillion at the end of the year. Net worth represents total assets such as homes and checking accounts minus liabilities like mortgages and credit card debt..." http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Household-net-worth-plunges-apf-14623113.html

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2009 UP AND DOWN WALL STREET DAILY Ignoring the Austrians Got Us in This Mess By RANDALL W. FORSYTH "...What definitely is ignored in academe is the Austrian school of economics, especially for baby boomers brought up on Samuelson's economics text, which was pure Keynesian orthodoxy. I did not learn the names von Mises and Hayek or their ideas until a decade or more after graduation (with a degree in economics, by the way.) The Austrian view is a mirror image on the right to Minsky's from the left. The economy, if left alone, is self-correcting, say the Austrians. But central banks' inflationary expansion of credit produces booms and malinvestments, which inevitably lead to a crashes and depressions. The only prevention for boom and busts are sound money, which is impossible with government-controlled central banks. Once the bust comes, the only cure is to let it run its course; allow the malinvestments go bankrupt and let the market reallocate the capital to productive uses... But the Austrians were the ones who could see the seeds of collapse in the successive credit booms, aided and abetted by Fed policies, especially under former chairman Alan Greenspan..." http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123680667244600275.html Veja tambem: The Bailout Reader. Link: http://mises.org/story/3128

Banco Central do Brasil vai baixar ainda mais a taxa de juros (SELIC)

March 12 (Bloomberg) -- Brazilian policy makers were unanimous in last night’s decision to cut the benchmark interest rate, signaling they’re prepared to reduce borrowing costs to a record low when they meet next month...-- http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=auI4K0RzmEWY&refer=latinamerica

Crise global: declinio de 50 000 bilhões de dólares

"... Falls in the value of financial assets worldwide might have reached more than $50,000bn, equivalent to a year’s global economic output, the Asian Development Bank will warn on Monday. Asia has been hit disproportionately hard, the bank will say, in a report that warns of many Asian stimulus plans lagging behind those of the leading global economies..." -- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3f9a2bd8-0c0e-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F3f9a2bd8-0c0e-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html%3Fnclick_check%3D1&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fabwblog.blogspot.com%2F&nclick_check=1

Brasil reduz taxa de juros

"... Com o agravamento da crise econômica, o Copom (Comitê de Política Monetária) do Banco Central decidiu nesta quarta-feira, por unanimidade, acelerar a queda dos juros e reduziu a taxa básica em 1,5 ponto percentual, cortando a Selic de 12,75% ao ano para 11,25% ao ano. Entenda como a taxa básica de juros influencia a economia Trata-se do segundo corte de juros desde a piora na crise, a partir de setembro. Em janeiro, o Copom reduziu a Selic de 13,75% para 12,75% --a próxima reunião será nos dias 28 e 29 de abril. A redução de hoje é a maior desde novembro de 2003, quando a taxa caiu de 19% para 17,50% ao ano. Com essa nova redução, a Selic voltou ao nível em que estava em março de 2008, o menor da história..." http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u532931.shtml

Aulas Economia Internacional

Caros alunos, na segunda que vem (16 de Março) não vai ter aula porque tem feriado em Aracaju no dia 17 de Março (mudança da capital). Para compensar tem de fazer as tarefas no fim do capitulo 1 de nosso livro de texto. Continuamos nos encontrar nas quartas as 17.20 horas e nas segundas as 17 horas como foi combinado. As provas estão previstas para começo de Abril (1. prova), começo de Maio (2. prova) e começo de Junho (3. prova) com as temáticas de Comercio internacional (1.) Balanço de pagamentos (2.) Finanças internacionais (3.). Se tem perguntas pode usar o acesso de comentários nesta página. Bom feriado, abraço, prof. Antony

Economia Internacional: Trade World Report

Documentação anual do Banco Mundial sobre o comércio internacional, o "Trade World Report". Veja: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr534_e.htm Conteúdo "... Trade has allowed nations to benefit from specialization and economies of scale to produce more efficiently. It has raised productivity, supported the spread of knowledge and new technologies, and enriched the range of choices available to consumers. But deeper integration into the world economy has not always proved popular, nor have the benefits of trade and globalization necessarily reached all sections of society. As a consequence, trade scepticism is on the rise in certain quarters.This year’s World Trade Report, entitled “Trade in a Globalizing World”, is devoted to an examination of the gains from international trade and the challenges arising from higher levels of integration..."

Economia Internacional - teorias de comércio exterior

Resumo das principais teorias de comércio exterior Contents: Mercantilism Absolute advantage Comparative advantage Factor proportions Leontief paradox Product life cycle Technology and trade Summary: no all-purpose trade theoryTrade traps Fonte: http://faculty.washington.edu/jwh/349lec03.htm

A grande depressão

"... How bad was the Great Depression? Over the four years from 1929 to 1933, production at the nation’s factories, mines and utilities fell by more than half. People’s real disposable incomes dropped 28 percent. Stock prices collapsed to one-tenth of their pre-crash height. The number of unemployed Americans rose from 1.6 million in 1929 to 12.8 million in 1933. One of every four workers was out of a job at the Depression’s nadir, and ugly rumors of revolt simmered for the first time since the Civil War..." http://fee.org/articles/great-myths-of-the-great-depression/print/

EU: Base monetária

Keynesianismo japonês

"... Most Japanese economists have tended to take a bleaker view of their nation’s track record, saying that Japan spent more than enough money, but wasted too much of it on roads to nowhere and other unneeded projects. Dr. Ihori of the University of Tokyo did a survey of public works in the 1990s, concluding that the spending created almost no additional economic growth. Instead of spreading beneficial ripple effects across the economy, he found that the spending actually led to declines in business investment by driving out private investors..." http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/asia/06japan.html?_r=4&hp=&pagewanted=all

Keynes em Japão

Macroeconomia de Japão

O fracaso da política keynesiana japonesa

HAMADA, Japan — The Hamada Marine Bridge soars majestically over this small fishing harbor, so much larger than the squid boats anchored below that it seems out of place. And it is not just the bridge. Two decades of generous public works spending have showered this city of 61,000 mostly graying residents with a highway, a two-lane bypass, a university, a prison, a children’s art museum, the Sun Village Hamada sports center, a bright red welcome center, a ski resort and an aquarium featuring three ring-blowing Beluga whales..." Leia mais sobre os gastos governamentais de Japão para "estimular" a economia: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/asia/06japan.html?_r=4&hp=&pagewanted=all

O que significa "Keynesiano"?

" ... What does "being Keynesian" mean? Simply believing in the role of demand-side factors in the determination of aggregate output is an insufficient characterisation. A true Keynesian differs, in so much as he also believes that: 1) monetary policy is not the most effective tool for stabilising the economy and it may be completely ineffective in some circumstances (liquidity trap); 2) fiscal policy is effective and government spending is the preferred tool; 3) government intervention works and short-run consequences are more important than long-run ones. With this definition in mind, there could be four ways in which the statement "we are all Keynesians now" can be interpreted. I propose that the statement is false in three out of four of these interpretations. The first interpretation is that the economic profession has reached a consensus on Keynesian positions. This statement is definitely false. If you browse through the articles published in the leading journal of the American Economic Association in 2008, you would find that only one of the 12 articles that deal with macroeconomic issues (JEL Code E) supports (albeit very indirectly) the idea of a fiscal policy expansion as a policy tool. An even stronger imbalance is present at the pinnacle of our profession. Among the 37 Economics Nobel prize winners in the last 20 years, four received the prize for their contributions to macroeconomics. None of these could be considered Keynesian. In fact, it is hard to find academic papers supporting the idea of a fiscal stimulus. The second possible interpretation is that there exists a consensus among economists that the causes of the current crisis are Keynesian. Even under this interpretation the statement is patently false. I do not think that any economist would dare to say that the current US economic crisis has been caused by underconsumption. With zero personal saving and a large budget deficit the Bush administration has run one of the most aggressive Keynesian policies in history. Not only has adherence to Keynes's principles not averted the current economic disaster, it has greatly contributed to causing it. The Keynesian desire to manage aggregate demand, ignoring the long-run costs, pushed Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke to keep interest rates extremely low in 2002, fuelling excessive consumption by the household sector and excessive risk-taking by the financial sector. Most importantly, it has been the Keynesian training of our policy-makers that has led them to ignore the role that incentives play in economic decisions. The main difference between Keynes and modern economics is the focus on incentives. Keynes studied the relation between macroeconomic aggregates, without any consideration for the underlying incentives that lead to the formation of these aggregates. By contrast, modern economics base all their analysis on incentives. In 1998, when the Fed co-ordinated the bail-out of Long Term Capital Management, it did not care about the impact this decision would have on the incentives to take risk and price liquidity appropriately. When Mr Bernanke engineered the bail-out of Bear Stearns, he did not care about the impact this decision would have on the other investment banks' incentives to raise equity capital at rock-bottom prices. When he changed his position twice in the space of two days, letting Lehman fail, but bailing out AIG, he did not care about the impact it would have on investors' confidence and incentives to invest. It is this erratic behaviour that has spooked the market and created the current economic crisis: in a recent survey 80% of Americans declare that they are less confident of investing in the market as a result of the way the government has intervened. If Keynesian principles and education are the cause of the current depression, it is hard to imagine they can be the solution. Thus, even the third interpretation of the house statement—that we should follow Keynesian prescriptions to combat the current economic crisis—is false. I am not disputing the idea that some government intervention can alleviate the current economic conditions, I am disputing that a Keynesian economic policy can do it. With a current-account deficit that in 2008 was $614 billion, a budget deficit that was $455 billion and military expenditures of $731 billion, it is hard to argue that the government is not stimulating demand sufficiently. The current crisis is not a demand crisis, it is a trust crisis. Bad corporate governance coupled with bad government policies has destroyed the financial sector, scaring investors and freezing lending. It is as if a nuclear bomb had destroyed all roads in America and we claimed that to alleviate the economic impact of such an event we should invest in banks. It is possible that eventually the effect will trickle down. But if the problem is the roads, you want to rebuild roads, not subsidise the financial sector. And if the problem is the financial sector, you want to fix this and not build roads. The only interpretation under which the house statement is true is that "we"—the English/American people and their elective representatives—are all Keynesians now. Keynesianism has conquered the hearts and minds of politicians and ordinary people alike because it provides a theoretical justification for irresponsible behaviour. Medical science has established that one or two glasses of wine per day are good for your long-term health, but no doctor would recommend a recovering alcoholic to follow this prescription. Unfortunately, Keynesian economists do exactly this. They tell politicians, who are addicted to spending our money, that government expenditures are good. And they tell consumers, who are affected by severe spending problems, that consuming is good, while saving is bad. In medicine, such behaviour would get you expelled from the medical profession; in economics, it gives you a job in Washington." --- http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/276

Contra Keynes e o Keynesianismo moderno

"... Robert Barro, Harvard University, said of the Obama fiscal stimulus proposal: "This is probably the worst bill that has been put forward since the 1930s. I don't know what to say. I mean it's wasting a tremendous amount of money. It has some simplistic theory that I don't think will work ... I don't think it will expand the economy ... It's more along the lines of throwing money at people ... I think it's garbage." (Barro seems to be talking about any and all stimulus bills). John Cochrane, University of Chicago, said: "It's not part of what anybody has taught graduate students since the 1960s … They are fairy tales that have been proved false. It is very comforting in times of stress to go back to the fairy tales we heard as children but it doesn't make them less false." To borrow money to pay for the spending, the government will issue bonds, which means investors will be buying US Treasuries instead of investing in equities or products, negating the stimulative effect, Cochrane added. Edward Prescott, Arizona State University, who won a Nobel prize for economics in 2004 for his study on business cycles, made this contribution: "Massive government spending likely lengthened the economic struggles each time. Economists in the field are deeply divided on the issue of federal stimulus … I don't know why Obama said all economists agree on this. They don't. If you go down to the third-tier schools, yes, but they're not the people advancing the science." Eugene Fama, University of Chicago, stated: "Bail-outs and stimulus plans are funded by issuing more government debt. (The money must come from somewhere!) The added debt absorbs savings that would otherwise go to private investment. In the end, despite the existence of idle resources, bail-outs and stimulus plans do not add to current resources in use. They just move resources from one use to another." The argument that Messrs Fama, Prescott, Cochrane, Barro, Poole and company are making is what economists call Say's law. It is the claim that decisions to increase spending—whether they come from the government or anybody else—cannot spur the economy and raise employment and production because demand must be created by supply. If the government spends, somebody else must cut back on their spending. Anyone who uses his or her eyes can determine that Say's law is in general false. Recall 2003-06, when capital inflows from Asia, easy money provided by the Federal Reserve and promises that financial engineering would cheaply diversify risk spurred homebuilders to spend money building houses. The American unemployment rate fell from 6.0% to 4.8%. Recall 1996-2000, when the assembled investors of America discovered the internet and in response businesses spent money like water on computers and telephones. The American unemployment rate fell 5.6% to 4.3%. In general, spending works to spur the economy, and the government's money when spent is as good as anybody else's. Even though Say's law is not true in general, could it possibly be true in this particular case? Could it happen that as the government starts its spending that the spending is, in Fama's words, "funded by issuing more government debt ... The added debt absorbs savings that would otherwise go to private investment ... and just moves resources from one use [private investment] to another [government purchases]"? Yes, it can happen. When government deficit spending triggers a sharp rise in interest rates, that rise in interest rates will discourage and crowd out private investment spending. But you have to have that rise in interest rates, and we don't: the ten-year Treasury rate last Friday was 3.02% per year, down from 4.01% back before Obama's election victory. Milton Friedman had some very harsh things to say about the Great Depression predecessors of Fama, Prescott, Cochrane, Barro, Poole and company when he contrasted his vision of Chicago-school monetary economics with theirs: "Chicago was one of the few academic centers at which the quantity theory continued to be ... central and vigorous ... throughout the 1930s and 1940s, where students continued to study monetary theory and to write theses on monetary problems. The quantity theory that retained this role differed sharply from the atrophied and rigid caricature that is so frequently described by the proponents of the new Keynesian income-expenditure approach—and with some justice, to judge by much of the literature on policy that was spawned by old quantity theorists." ... -- http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/276

Krugman quer mais gastos públicos

Paul Krugman escreve: "President Obama’s plan to stimulate the economy was “massive,” “giant,” “enormous.” So the American people were told, especially by TV news, during the run-up to the stimulus vote. Watching the news, you might have thought that the only question was whether the plan was too big, too ambitious. Yet many economists, myself included, actually argued that the plan was too small and too cautious. The latest data confirm those worries — and suggest that the Obama administration’s economic policies are already falling behind the curve..." http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/opinion/09krugman.html?_r=2&ref=opinion&pagewanted=print

Política de demanda agregada

"... Barack Obama’s top economic adviser has urged world leaders to pump more public money into the economy in a co-ordinated effort to boost demand and lift the world out of recession. In an interview with the Financial Times, Lawrence Summers said the urgent need for a short-term increase in spending by governments temporarily overrode the longer-term goal of tackling the global imbalances many economists believe caused the financial crisis..." http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d8b5e18-0c14-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1

Reservas livres no sistema bancario dos EU

Base monetária

"Salvar" a economia pode causar nova onda de inflação

March 9 (Bloomberg) -- Billionaire Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway Inc. posted its worst results ever in 2008, said the economy “has fallen off a cliff” and that efforts to stimulate recovery may lead to inflation higher than the 1970s.

Americans are fearful, confused and changing their buying habits, which is showing up at Berkshire’s operating units, Buffett said during an appearance on the CNBC television network today. U.S. stocks fell after Buffett’s comments, following the worst weekly slump in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index since November.

“We are doing things now that are potentially very inflationary,” Buffett said... Fonte

Sobre bilhões e trilhões

SANTA MONICA, Calif. (MarketWatch) -- There's a $700 trillion elephant in the room and it's time we found out how much it really weighs on the economy. Derivative contracts total about three-quarters of a quadrillion dollars in "notional" amounts, according to the Bank for International Settlements. These contracts are tallied in notional values because no one really can say how much they are worth. But valuing them correctly is exactly what we should be doing because these comprise the viral disease that has infected the financial markets and the economies of the world. Try as we might to salvage the residential real estate market, it's at best worth $23 trillion in the U.S. We're struggling to save the stock market, but that's valued at less than $15 trillion. And we hope to keep the entire U.S. economy from collapsing, yet gross domestic product stands at $14.2 trillion. Compare any of these to the derivatives market and you can easily see that we are just closing the windows as a tsunami crashes to shore. The total value of all the stock markets in the world amounts to less than $50 trillion, according to the World Federation of Exchanges...." http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/The-700-trillion-elephant-room/story.aspx?guid={024DB809-8506-4AA9-83BB-B053FD4E1C11}

Os 25 culpados pela crise (apud Time)

Fuente: Mauricio David"Revista Time elege os 25 culpados pela crise econômica" Após tentar achar as causas e soluções à crise financeira mundial, a busca agora é pelos possíveis responsáveis que levaram empresas a falirem, causando demissões e a ameaça de recessão global. Primeiro, o jornal inglês The Times listou os possíveis dez principais culpados. Nesta quinta-feira, foi a vez da revista Time selecionar 25 empresários, economistas e políticos que levaram a economia mundial às turbulências atuais. Entre os considerados responsáveis está Angelo Mozilo, ex-diretor e fundador da Countrywide (maior financiadora imobiliária dos Estados Unidos). Segundo a Time, a empresa não foi a primeira a fazer "financiamentos exóticos com habilidade questionável", mas o fez. O jornal britânico The Times diz que Mozilo é acusado de empurrar crédito para quem não poderia pagar, enquanto isso recebia um salário anual de US$ 470 milhões. Presidente do Comitê de Bancos do Senado entre 1995 e 2000, Phil Gramm isentou o credit-default swaps (CDS, espécie de seguro para crédito de risco) de regulação. E, segundo a revista, foi exatamente o CDS que levou o AIG à quebra. Ex-presidente do Federal Reserve (FED, banco central americano) Alan Greenspan foi colocado na lista da Time por seu "desprezo" pela regulação de mercado, considerada hoje uma das principais causas da crise. Em outubro de 2008, durante uma audiência no Congresso, Greenspan admitiu que "cometeu um erro ao presumir" que os mercados financeiros poderiam regular a si próprios. Christopher Cox, ex-chefe do Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), é culpado por nunca ter percebido ou agido nas acusações contra o investidor Bernard Madoff , que realizou fraude de US$ 50 bilhões com vítimas em todo o mundo. Além disso, é acusado pela revista de não ter regulado instituições para tentar impedir o colapso. A Time também culpa os consumidores americanos pela crise. Segundo a publicação, os empréstimos e gastos excessivos foram alguns dos principais responsáveis pela situação econômica atual. Secretário do Tesouro dos EUA de 2006 até o fim do governo de George W. Bush, Henry Paulson é um dos responsáveis citados por ter demorado para agir em meio aos primeiros sinais de crise, por permitir a falência do Lehman Brothers e por causa do pacote de US$ 750 bilhões, que foi uma "grande bagunça". John Cassano é um dos fundadores da unidade de produtos financeiros da AIG e administrou o grupo até o início de 2008 - pouco antes de a empresa pedir ajuda do governo para não falir. Por esse motivo, ele é citado como um dos responsáveis pela crise. Até hoje, o governo americano já investiu US$ 150 bilhões para evitar a quebra da empresa. Ian McCarthy, CEO da imobiliária Beazer Homes, é acusado de usar táticas agressivas para vendas e inclusive mentir sobre as qualificações de consumidores para ajudá-los a conseguir empréstimos, tendo participado ativamente do que iniciou a crise. Presidente da Fannie Mae até 2004, Franklin Raines deixou a companhia em meio a um escândalo administrativo e o início dos grandes investimentos em subprime. As agências de classificação de riscos, que deram notas máximas "em grandes proporções" e até a companhias de risco, também são citadas pela Time. Kathleen Corbet, que comandou a Standard & Poor's foi considerada uma das culpadas pela crise. Conhecido como o "gorila de Wall Street", Dick Fuld direcionou o Lehman Brothers diretamente ao subprime. "Por sua incompetência", Fuld foi selecionado para a lista. Herb e Marion Sandler foram os primeiros a oferecer empréstimos imobiliários "perigosos", por meio do World Savings Bank. O Goldman Sachs estima que cerca de metade dos dois milhões de consumidores que possuem esse tipo de financiamento não vão conseguir pagar o valor total. A administração do ex-presidente americano Bill Clinton foi caracterizada por prosperidade econômica e por desregular o mercado financeiro, que podem ter influenciado os excessos das empresas dos últimos anos. Também é listado como um dos responsáveis o ex-presidente George W. Bush, também acusado de não incentivar a regulação do mercado. Mas Bush também foi colocado na lista pelo simples fato de a crise ter desencadeado durante sua administração. O CEO do Merrill Lynch até 2007, Stan O'Neal, foi responsável por transformar o negócio da empresa, mas apoiando-se em subprime e empréstimos. O primeiro-ministro chinês, Wen Jiabao, também é relacionado na lista da Time. O motivo é a China ser a principal credora dos Estados Unidos. Segundo a revista, o crédito baixo é o grande causador da crise. David Lereah era o economista-chefe da associação americana de corretores quando disse que o mercado imobiliário iria crescer por muito tempo. Por esse motivo, ele foi considerado um dos culpados pela crise. Os fundos de investimentos do tipo hedge funds são responsáveis pela má administração de empréstimos por comprarem crédito hipotecário. John Devaney tornou rentável empresas de crédito por fazer empréstimos questionáveis. O americano Bernard Madoff é acusado de uma fraude de US$ 50 bilhões a investidores, tornando-se o maior fraudador de todos os tempos dos Estados Unidos. Seu golpe foi descoberto em meio à crise, quando seus clientes tentaram resgatar seus investimentos. Considerado o pai do sistema de crédito hipotecário, Lew Ranieri também está na lista da publicação. Foi quando consumidores pararam de pagar seus empréstimos deste tipo que os bancos de investimentos entraram na crise. Burton Jablin criou programas de TV que ajudaram a inflar a bolha do mercado imobiliário americano, ao ensinar os espectadores a valorizar suas casas ao máximo. Segundo a revista, economistas consideram Fred Goodwin, ex-chefe do Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), "o pior banqueiro do mundo". Sua "ganância" fez o banco adquirir outras 20 instituições. O pior, segundo a Time, foi ele não ter parado aí e liderou a compra do ABN Amro por US$ 100 bilhões, prejudicando as reservas do RBS. Sandy Weill, dono do Citigroup, está na lista pelas aquisições do Smith Barney e Travelers. Segundo a revista, bancos muito grandes são os piores problemas econômicos dos Estados Unidos. Cada instituição financeira parece muito grande para falir, levando o governo a gastar bilhões de dólares para evitar quebras. David Oddsson foi primeiro-ministro da Islândia e, depois, presidente do banco central, levando o país a uma nova era de mercados livres e privatizando três dos principais bancos. As instituições financeiras não resistiram a crise e lutam para não quebrar. A má administração do Bear Stearns levou Jimmy Cayne a integrar a lista. Segundo a publicação, Cayne tinha finais de semana prolongados para jogar golfe, saía da cidade para torneios esportivos e é acusado de fumar maconha (o que nega). ______________________ Marie-Christine LACOSTE, CNRS, Information Scientifique Coordinadora de "RUMBOS" Lista de Informacion y Red de Investigadores sobre y de America Latina (Ciencias Sociales - Politicas, Economicas, Desarrollo Urbano y Rural...)Idiomas circulando en la Lista : Espanol, Ingles, Portugues, FrancesDireccion Postal : Maison de la Recherche, Université de Toulouse-le-Mirail5, Allées Antonio Machado - 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9 (France)e.mail : lacoste@univ-tlse2.fr Telefono oficina : 05 61 50 47 34

Detroit, EU, casas para um dólar e menos

"... In extreme cases, homes are on sale for $1 or less, which has enticed investors to Detroit from as far away as the United Kingdom and Australia..."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090309/ap_on_bi_ge/landlord_nation

A bolsa de valores (DJI) deste a eleição de Obama