terça-feira, 18 de agosto de 2009
EU: Indicadores macroeconômicos
segunda-feira, 17 de agosto de 2009
domingo, 16 de agosto de 2009
sexta-feira, 7 de agosto de 2009
Análise Macroeconômica III
quarta-feira, 5 de agosto de 2009
Aniversário
terça-feira, 4 de agosto de 2009
Dinamica Macroeconomica
sexta-feira, 24 de julho de 2009
terça-feira, 21 de julho de 2009
quinta-feira, 16 de julho de 2009
Notas Economia Internacional
Notas Macro
quarta-feira, 15 de julho de 2009
Notas
sábado, 4 de julho de 2009
quinta-feira, 2 de julho de 2009
India-Brasil: comércio sem US dólar
segunda-feira, 29 de junho de 2009
Trabalhos
Why is Brazil "Underdeveloped"?
John H. Coatsworth
The numbers tell the story (see the table). Brazil is underdeveloped because its economy failed to grow or grew too slowly for most of its history. In the colonial era, sugar, gold and slavery did not create a dynamic economy. In the mid-eighteenth century, Brazil’s economic backwardness worried its Portuguese rulers, but not even the great Pombal, as historian Kenneth Maxwell has shown, could not make good policy substitute for good business. At the time of independence (1822) Brazil had one of the least productive economies in the western hemisphere, with a per capita GDP lower than any other New World colony for which we have estimates.
After independence, while the industrial revolution gather steam elsewhere, imperial Brazil stagnated, growing at a mere 0.2 to 0.3 percent from 1820 to 1870. By the time slavery ended and the empire fell (1888-89), Brazil had a per capita GDP less than half of Mexico’s and only one sixth of the United States. Even when the end of slavery (1888) stimulated massive immigration, the economy failed to grow consistently.
Then came the turn around. From 1913 to 1980, Brazil experienced sustained growth, interrupted only briefly in the early years of the Great Depression, at nearly two percent per year from 1913 to 1950 and nearly four percent from 1950 to 1980. In this period of nearly seven decades, Brazil had the fastest growing economy in the western hemisphere. Per capita GDP increased over eight hundred percent, from $678 in 1900 to $5570 in 2000, measured in 1990 dollars. Brazil’s economy gained on the U.S. economy, rising from only ten percent of US GDP per capita to over 20 percent.
Brazil’s long era of economic growth ended with the crisis of 1982. For the past quarter century, the Brazilian economy has barely grown at all. It has occasionally spurted ahead, as in the past three years, but has fallen back each time it does so. Unfortunately, Brazil cannot turn the clock back and restore the conditions and policies that spurred growth up to 1980.
Why has Brazil grown so slowly for most of its history? Economic historians point to three kinds of answers: geography, institutions and policies.
Leia mais: http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/revista/issues/view/546
China - Brasil: comércio sem o US dólar
LOS ANGELES (MarketWatch) -- The central bank governors of China and Brazil have agreed in principle to allow trade between the two countries to be settled in their respective currencies, reports said Sunday.
People's Bank of China Gov. Zhou Xiaochuan and Banco Central do Brazil President Henrique Meirelles met on the sidelines of the Bank for International Settlement's annual general meeting in Basel and said they would study how to implement the plan, the reports said.
The move would bypass the U.S. dollar, to settle trade invoices in Chinese yuan and Brazilian reals.
sexta-feira, 26 de junho de 2009
O rei do pop deixa uma montanha de dívidas
Anúncio - Economia Internacional
terça-feira, 23 de junho de 2009
Fim da "grande moderação"
"... We stand at a momentous point in macroeconomic policy thinking. A couple of years ago, it was possible to argue that monetary arrangements were good enough to avoid, or at least temper, nasty economic developments. We understood enough, apparently, to avoid the mistakes of the 1970s. We were living through the Great Moderation, the Great Stability or, as Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, once put it, the NICE (non-inflationary continuous expansion) decade.
Two years later, after the onset of the biggest financial meltdown in living memory and the deepest, most synchronised, global downswing since the 1930s, it is no longer obvious that the Great Moderation amounted to much. Policymakers may have avoided a repeat of the 1970s, with its noxious mixture of high inflation and stagnant growth, but it is now difficult to talk with a straight face of Moderation, Stability or NICE-ness.
The Great Moderation was a story about the reduced volatility of output and inflation and "no more boom and bust", which Gordon Brown probably wishes he had never uttered. There is no doubt that, for a while, economic developments were favourable. From the mid-1980s in the US and the mid-1990s in the UK, it appeared that economic life had become more stable. The question all along was whether this stemmed from structural changes in economic behaviour, from the impact of new, and improved, policy frameworks, or just good luck..." --
Leia mais nesta crítica fundamental da política macroeconômica da actualidade: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/stephen-king/stephen-king-good-luck-not-good-providence-was-at-the-core-of-happier-times-1712416.html
domingo, 21 de junho de 2009
Planejamento Macro III e Economia Internacional
Fim da liberdade econômica nos Estados Unidos
quarta-feira, 17 de junho de 2009
A economia brasileira
terça-feira, 16 de junho de 2009
Macroeconomia: Prova III
Os BRICs e o dólar
segunda-feira, 15 de junho de 2009
Os BRICs e o dólar
Leaders of Russia, China, India and Brazil do not intend to discuss new global reserve currencies at their first summit in the Urals city of Yekaterinburg on Tuesday, a top Kremlin aide said on Sunday.
"We will hardly be discussing the new reserve currencies," Sergei Prikhodko told reporters. "As far as practical issues are concerned, we will speak more about the possible ways to reform international financial institutions."
Brazil, Russia, India and China are trying to strengthen their clout as the producers of 15 percent of global output by building up their BRIC grouping into a powerful world player.
Russia, holder of the world's third largest foreign exchange reserves, has called for the world to become less dependent on the dollar and suggested that the yuan and the rouble could become reserve currencies in the future.
Concerns that dollar's role as the dominant reserve currency has contributed to global financial instability has been discussed by BRIC's top security officials, who met in Moscow last month to prepare the summit.
Brazilian Strategic Affairs Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger told Reuters last month the summit was due to discuss the role of the U.S. dollar, strengthening the G20 group, reshaping the world trade regime and reform of the United Nations.
"We don't want a European-style central bank made global. We don't want a global Brussels," he said, adding that the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights were an option as long as the issuer's powers were limited.
Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Saturday the dollar's role as the world's main reserve currency was unlikely to change in the near future
"It is hard to say that in the next few years this system will change significantly," Kudrin told reporters after a meeting of finance minister of the G8 (Group of Eight) leading economies in Italy.
sábado, 13 de junho de 2009
Riqueza Americana
NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- Americans saw $1.3 trillion of wealth vaporize in the first quarter of 2009, as the stock market and home values continued to decline, according to a government report released Thursday.Household net worth fell to $50.4 trillion, according to the flow of funds report by the Federal Reserve. Americans' stock holdings plunged 5.8% to $5.2 trillion and mutual funds holdings slid 4.1% to $3.3 trillion, while their home value dropped 2.4% to $17.9 trillion.
The nation's households have now seen their net worth shrink for seven straight quarters. Family net worth had hit an all-time high of $64.4 trillion in the second quarter of 2007, thanks to the housing bubble and a strong stock market..."
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/11/news/economy/Americans_wealth_drops/?postversion=2009061115
Estados Unidos: multiplicador monetário
O gráfico mostra o multiplicador monetário (m) de M1 para os Estados Unidos.
MB x m = M
O seu colapso significa que a base monetário (MB) não aumenta mais a massa monetária (M). Isto acontece se o multiplicador (m) é igual à um.
A causo principal do colapso do multiplicador monetário é uma redução em emprestimos.
A transmissão monetária está bloqueada nos mercados financeiros. Com a velocidade (V) também caindo, a renda nacional (Y) está em contracção, seguinte Y = M x V
sexta-feira, 12 de junho de 2009
quarta-feira, 10 de junho de 2009
terça-feira, 9 de junho de 2009
Macro 3 - Prova 3
Estados Unidos: colapso dos investimentos no setor privado
Um colapso dramático dos investimentos bruto no sector privado dos Estados Unidos que nunca aconteceu em este tamanho desde se tem estas estatísticas.
As consequências são óbvios: mais desemprego, menos crescimento económico, menos receita do governo, e, consequentemente, ainda mais dívida pública ou, mais exacto, uma explosão do coeficiente de endividamento (Bt/Y).
segunda-feira, 8 de junho de 2009
Economia Internacional - Prova 3
Economia Internacional - Planejamento
Modelo ISLMBP
quinta-feira, 4 de junho de 2009
Fim do dólar - chegada do yuan?
China has taken yet another step to transform the yuan into the dominant global currency, a long-term initiative that could ultimately dethrone the dollar as the world’s top unit of exchange.
In the last four months alone, China has signed currency swap agreements worth more than $95 billion (650 billion yuan) with an array of nations - including: Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Belarus and Hong Kong - that are only too glad to move away from the increasingly shaky U.S. dollar.
For Westerners who are struggling to come to terms with the notion of a disarrayed dollar, the thought of oil, gold or other commodities being priced in yuan instead of dollars has to seem about as likely as having another country put a man on the moon.
But the Chinese yuan is already well on its way to becoming that globally accepted standard unit of exchange and the proverbial genie, as they say, is out of the bottle. In fact, I’d even go so far as to say the dollar’s days of dominance are numbered and with each new round of bailout chicanery, the clock is winding down ever faster..." --
quarta-feira, 3 de junho de 2009
Macro III
terça-feira, 2 de junho de 2009
Orígem e consequências da crise
O que está por trás da crise do mercado financeiro?
Por Antony Mueller
"... Uma profunda reestruturação do capital global se tornou inevitável. Tal processo é bem diferente de uma recessão no sentido tradicional. Contrariamente a uma recessão profunda, porém de vida curta, quando, após seu término, os negócios usuais e a rotina continuam normalmente, a reestruturação de uma economia cuja estrutura do capital está completamente distorcida irá levar um bom tempo. O reequilíbrio da estrutura do capital de uma economia requer um trabalho de empreendedorismo duradouro, gradativo e específico. E isso só pode ser realizado sob a orientação daquele processo de descoberta típico de um ambiente concorrencial, processo esse que é inerente ao funcionamento do sistema de preços em um mercado desobstruído.
Políticas monetárias e fiscais anti-cíclicas não são de qualquer ajuda quando se considera a labuta diária dos negócios e seu trabalho em direção ao restabelecimento de uma estrutura equilibrada do capital. O chamado multiplicador da renda não vai funcionar, bem como taxas de juros menores não irão estimular o gasto. Ao contrário: essas medidas políticas somente irão tornar a tarefa do empreendedor ainda mais difícil.
As dificuldades à frente surgem do fato de que os negócios comuns não podem seguir adiante sob um ambiente de contração de crédito, que tem suas raízes nas distorções da estrutura do capital da economia. Assim, mesmo que toda a baderna do mercado financeiro seja resolvida, não haverá uma simples ressurreição do velho jeito de se fazer negócios. A crença de que após o término da crise financeira a economia real irá ressurgir incólume é provavelmente o maior erro que muitos investidores compartilham com as autoridades políticas..."
segunda-feira, 1 de junho de 2009
Trabalhos Macro III e Economia Internacional
sábado, 30 de maio de 2009
Aulas Macro III e Economia Internacional
As orígens da crise
John B. Taylor identifica a política monetária excessiva como a causa da crise:
"... Monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, especially in 2003-2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say what good policy should be based on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that worked well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented the boom and the bust. Researchers at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have provided corroborating evidence from other countries: The greater the degree of monetary excess in a country, the larger was the housing boom.
The effects of the boom and bust were amplified by several complicating factors including the use of subprime and adjustable-rate mortgages, which led to excessive risk taking. There is also evidence the excessive risk taking was encouraged by the excessively low interest rates. Delinquency rates and foreclosure rates are inversely related to housing price inflation. These rates declined rapidly during the years housing prices rose rapidly, likely throwing mortgage underwriting programs off track and misleading many people..."
sexta-feira, 29 de maio de 2009
Recuperação econômica bloqueada
A alta carga da dívida do consumidor bloqueia a recuperação econômica:
May 29 (Bloomberg) -- "... The harsh reality is that the once-mighty U.S. consumer is setting out on a long, debt-reduction marathon that will mute economic recovery in America and among its major trading partners...
The issue with consumers: Their balance sheets are a bloated mess with household debt still unsustainably high at more than 130 percent of income. Getting the ratio down to a more realistic sub-100 percent level -- never mind the 60 percent to 70 percent range seen in the 1960s and 1970s -- involves serious consumption cutbacks. With consumers accounting for about 70 percent of the U.S. economy, this one-time engine of growth may easily become a dead weight..." --
quinta-feira, 28 de maio de 2009
A orígem da crise financeira
Yield curve analysis
Use este link para observar (mover a linha vermelha) as mudanças no "yield curve" -- a estrutura das taxas de juros -- desde 2000. Observe que no top da bolsa de valores no Julio 2007 a curva era "flat" (quase horizontal) e como desde este tempo a curva se torna cada vez mais "steep".
Fonte: http://stockcharts.com/charts/YieldCurve.html
quarta-feira, 27 de maio de 2009
Hiperinflação USA
May 27 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy will enter “hyperinflation” approaching the levels in Zimbabwe because the Federal Reserve will be reluctant to raise interest rates, investor Marc Faber said.
Prices may increase at rates “close to” Zimbabwe’s gains, Faber said in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Hong Kong. Zimbabwe’s inflation rate reached 231 million percent in July, the last annual rate published by the statistics office.
“I am 100 percent sure that the U.S. will go into hyperinflation,” Faber said. “The problem with government debt growing so much is that when the time will come and the Fed should increase interest rates, they will be very reluctant to do so and so inflation will start to accelerate.”--
Leia maissegunda-feira, 25 de maio de 2009
A posição do Brasil no BRICs
sexta-feira, 22 de maio de 2009
Como abrir link
quinta-feira, 21 de maio de 2009
quarta-feira, 20 de maio de 2009
O fantasma do dinheiro
Festival da dívida
Japão: depois de 19 anos da política Keynesiana excessiva
terça-feira, 19 de maio de 2009
Medo da deflação
Macro III - prova 2 - 21 de Maio 2009
Fórmulas básicas
Para a prova 2 em Macro III
Taxa de juros de curto prazo Estados Unidos
Grande Depressão
segunda-feira, 18 de maio de 2009
A responsabilidade do economista
Collapso da economia Americana
Grande futuro para os emergentes
Dicas para prova 2 de Macro III
Estados Unidos: Mercado de imóveis em crise
As cidades mais afectadas da crise immobilária com as percentagens onde a dívida do objeto é maior do valor de mercado.
Fonte: http://finance.yahoo.com/real-estate/article/107041/House-Price-Drops-Leave-More-Underwater

































