quinta-feira, 26 de novembro de 2015

Déficit orçamentário

Governo federal tem deficit inédito de R$ 12,3 bilhões em outubro

ISABEL VERSIANI
DE BRASÍLIA

26/11/2015 16h13

Alan Marques - 3.nov.2015/Folhapress

A presidente Dilma Rousseff durante abertura da 5ª Conferência Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional
O governo federal registrou em outubro um deficit em suas contas de R$ 12,3 bilhões, levando o rombo acumulado no ano a R$ 33 bilhões.
Segundo o Tesouro Nacional, que divulgou os dados nesta quinta-feira (26), o deficit do mês foi o maior para outubro em valores correntes (sem descontar o efeito da inflação). O segundo maior deficit foi registrado em 1998, quando o saldo foi negativo em R$ 1,5 bilhão.
Em outubro de 2014, a União registrou um superavit primário de R$ 4 bilhões no mês e acumulou no ano um deficit de R$ 11,6 bilhões.
O governo estima que poderá fechar 2015 com um deficit de R$ 120 bilhões. O valor inclui uma despesa de R$ 57 bilhões com a quitação das chamadas pedaladas —dívidas da União com os bancos estatais—, mas ainda não está claro se esse pagamento será feito ainda este ano.
O Congresso ainda precisa aprovar a mudança da meta fiscal para o ano —a meta inicial do governo era encerrar 2015 com um superavit de R$ 55,3 bilhões.
A não votação da proposta até o fim do ano pode levar a presidente Dilma Rousseff a ser enquadrada pela Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) e responder pelo crime de responsabilidade. Isso porque, sem a mudança, o governo acabaria gastando mais do que o previsto pela lei orçamentária.

Política monetária americana

Scott Sumner

The Fed is above the law

More Data or Less?...Douglass North, RIP...
This post may upset some people, but I am simply trying to describe the world as it is, not as I would wish it to be. I recently spoke with Ryan Hart, who is researching the legal status of Fed policy. That got me thinking about the Fed's mandate, and whether it is legally enforceable.
The Fed is an independent agency, but not as independent as some other agencies. For instance, the Fed chair can be fired without cause, and that's not true of some other agency heads. But in other respects, the Fed seems to be "above the law" in a way that is almost unique in the American system, at least as far as I know. (Please correct me if I am wrong.)
When agencies like the EPA decide on a new policy, such as calling CO2 a form of pollution, the decision often ends up in the courts. But that's not true of Fed monetary policy decisions. Why not? My theory is that this seeming immunity from legal oversight is a product of the Fed's strange history. It was not created to do what it currently does, which is target inflation.
Broadly speaking, Fed history can be divided up into three periods:
1. 1914-68: A gold price peg (actually two pegs).
2. 1968-81: The Great Inflation
3. 1982-present: Inflation targeting
Under the gold standard, a central bank is unable to target inflation at 2%, at least for any extended period of time. When the Fed was created, no one imagined that they would engage in inflation targeting. Thus no thought was given to a Fed mandate to stabilize the macroeconomy, although lawmakers certainly hoped that the lender of last resort provision would reduce banking instability.
During the 1970s, the Fed did have the power to control inflation. So why didn't they? Their failure was due to the fact that the Fed, as well as most outside economists, didn't realize that they could control inflation. Milton Friedman understood, but many Keynesians, even highly distinguished Keynesians, blamed inflation on everything except monetary policy---labor unions, budget deficits, oil shocks, even crop failures in the Soviet Union. Today these theories seem silly, but they were taken very seriously at the time. For some reason, almost no one connected the post-1965 orgy of money printing with the mid-1960s upswing in inflation:
Screen Shot 2015-11-24 at 10.00.52 AM.png
In order to understand the Fed's "dual mandate" you need to understand the time period in which it was enacted. In 1977, Congress gave the Fed a mandate for stable prices, high employment and moderate long-term interest rates. But Congress was not giving the Fed a target, they were essentially saying; "It would be nice if we lived in a world of stable prices and high employment; in the off chance that there is anything you guys at the Fed can do to make it happen, please do so." I don't think anyone in Congress seriously thought the Fed could just pick an inflation rate, like 2%, out of thin air and target it.
How did the Fed react after being given the mandate for "stable prices"? Here's how:
Year---CPI Inflation
1977--6.5%
1978--7.6%
1979--11.3%
1980--13.5%
1981--10.3%
Prices rose 60% in 5 years. Unemployment also rose in 1980, and longer-term interest rates hit an all time record of around 15% in 1981. I think it's safe to say that these numbers are not what Congress had in mind. But no legal action was taken against the Fed, and indeed the Fed was not even blamed for the inflation. Again, the mandate was not viewed as a Fed target, and when the Fed sharply cut interest rates in the summer of 1980, despite 13% inflation, it was obvious to everyone that they were not targeting 2% inflation, and few people cared. (BTW, Paul Volcker did that insane easy money policy in mid-1980.) So if the courts were ever going to adjudicate a case against the Fed using the "original intent" approach, the Fed would win in a heartbeat. There was obviously no Congressional intent for the Fed to stop inflation.
Of course the Fed eventually did begin targeting inflation, at around 2% since 1990. But this was not because of the Congressional mandate, which as we saw the Fed ignored in 1980, but rather because they began to understand the ideas of Milton Friedman---persistent inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. When the Fed succeeded, outside observers were stunned, flabbergasted. Almost no one had thought this was possible. Alan Greenspan (who liked to speak in cryptic ways) was viewed as some sort of a magician, a "maestro." John McCain suggested that if Greenspan died his body ought to be propped up and kept in place, as in the film Weekend at Bernie's.
Of course all this was wrong; keeping inflation close to 2% is easy, and other central banks also succeeded. Today many economists (including me) are horrified by the Fed missing on the low side by 1%, an accuracy that would have been viewed as mind-bogglingly impressive in the 1970s.
Because outsiders were impressed by the Fed's success in controlling inflation, the Fed rose even further above the law. Now any outsider who wanted to tinker with the Fed was seen as a crackpot, and the Fed became a sort of mysterious temple, which is far above politics.
So that's how we got to where we are today. Yes, in theory the Fed has a "mandate." But in practice the Fed can do whatever it thinks best (obviously within reason) and no one will stop them. In practice, the Fed tends to adhere closely to the consensus view of mainstream macroeconomists, so any court case against the Fed would face the uphill battle, with the economics profession closing ranks around the Fed, perhaps even testifying in their favor. Lots of luck winning that sort of case in Federal court. Do you know any Federal judges that want to go down in history for having caused a Great Depression, or Great Inflation? Neither do I.
PS. This post describes the Fed's role on monetary policy; nothing I said applies to banking regulation, which is much more political.

quarta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2015

In memoriam D.C. North - Lições da nova teoria institucional para o desenvolvimento

Are we all institutionalists now? What should development agencies really learn from the New Institutional Economics? John Nye discusses the impediments to growth in underdeveloped countries and explains why most reform attempts ignore the most important distortions in poorly functioning economies and misunderstand the incentives facing both donors and recipients.
Assista
To learn more about New Institutional Economics and John Nye's work visit: http://mercatus.org/john-nye
The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Douglas North (1920-2015) has passed away at the age of 95 years old.
Douglas North was a leading developer of that has come to be called the "New Institutionalism," or an approach that gives emphasis and focus to the nature, significance and evolution of social, economic and political institutions in the context of which human beings may be able to prosper with wide degrees of personal freedom and choice.
He never felt comfortable wearing a political label on his sleeve, and was not a proponent of radical free market economics. But, nonetheless, economic and social history assisted his sharp analytical mind in understanding and explaining that human change and progress is based on three elements, as he once said:
"Economic change is the result of changes, one, in the quantity and quality of human beings; two, in the stock of human knowledge, particularly as it applies to human command over nature; and, three, to the institutional matrix that defines the incentive structure of society."
Central to North's story was that too many "mainstream" economists focus on mechanical models that presume that the future will be like the past, and that therefore the future may in many ways be predicted from the observed human events of the past.
What this ignored, North insisted, was the power of ideas. Not only that "ideas" shape the world. But that ideas and the complex manifestations they take on in actual human actions and outcomes, contain degrees of inherent unpredictability that means we have to take a more "open-ended" conception of human events and their intended and unintended consequences.
All that we can intelligently do is appreciate which social institutional orders and arrangements are more adaptive and flexible to foster and adjust to a world of potential change, so mankind may benefit in sundry ways from man's possibilities.
The "wrong" institutions and institutional arrangements can impede this process and its cumulative outcomes. The freer and more open the market order the greater the opportunities to gain from man's creative potentials that show themselves under the right, more market-oriented incentives.
We also must appreciate, North said, that there are formal and informal societal "rules of the game." The formal ones, such as the legal structures and the political institutions have degrees of reformability in the closer "here and now." Regulations restricting foreign trade or domestic competition can be repealed or reduced if there is the political will and sufficient social support.
But accompanying these formal rules of the game are the informal ones of people belief and value systems that define how people see themselves, others, and the social order in which they live.
These informal rules of the game are much less easy to change, modify or transform. They involve what is often referred to as "cultural shifts" and these are far more difficult and time-consuming to transform, and can themselves impede or prevent changes in those more formal social rules.
The latter requires changes in people's "hearts and minds," that does not get transformed over night. The economic educator's task, the conclusion from Douglas North's contribution suggests, is that attention and focus must be on the slow but essential process of changing the ways people view themselves and the social possibilities in which they live.
Among Douglas North's most important works are:
"The Rise of the Western World" (1973); "Structure and Change in Economic History" (1981); "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance" (1990); and "Understanding the Process of Economic Change" (2005).
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993.
A great economic historian, Mr North tackled the big questions, like why some countries become rich while others remain poor
ECONOMIST.COM

Aracaju - 13 de Julho


terça-feira, 24 de novembro de 2015

Douglas C. North

Obituary: Douglass C. North, Nobel Prize-winning economist, 95

By Gerry Everding
Douglass C. North, PhD, co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and the Spencer T. Olin Professor Emeritus in Arts & Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis, died Monday, Nov. 23, 2015, at his summer home in Benzonia, Mich. He was 95.

An economic historian, North examined the formation of political and economic institutions and the consequences of these institutions on the performance of economies through time.

In 1993, North and Robert Fogel, PhD, then an economist with the University of Chicago, won the Nobel in economic sciences “for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.”

During his academic career, which spanned more than 60 years, he pondered complex variations of a simple question: Why do some countries become rich, while others remain poor?
Mais

Prize Lecture

Economic Performance through Time

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html

Economia comportamental

Introdução a teoria econômica comportamental
http://www.economiacomportamental.org/guia-economia-comportamental.pdf

Mercosul - Argentina - novo presidente


Gustavo Franco sobre a economia brasileira da atualidade

O economista e ex-presidente do Banco Central Gustavo Franco falará, entre outros assuntos, da crise econômica, do ajuste fiscal, das perspectivas de mudança no Ministério da Fazenda e as projeções para os próximos anos.
Assista

segunda-feira, 23 de novembro de 2015

Custo Brasil


Desemprego

Dilma sanciona lei de proteção ao trabalho em meio a crise e alta no desemprego


BRASÍLIA (Reuters) - A presidente Dilma Rousseff sancionou nesta quinta-feira a lei que cria o Programa de Proteção ao Emprego (PPE) e comemorou o que chamou de decisão acertada do governo para proteger os empregos, afirmando que o Brasil não pode desperdiçar o momento de crise e tomar as decisões acertadas para o futuro....
A sanção da lei foi feita no mesmo dia em que o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) divulgou a maior taxa de desemprego para o mês de outubro em oito anos, 7,9 por cento, com maior procura de emprego e fechamento de vagas.
Mais

quarta-feira, 11 de novembro de 2015

Vantagens comparativas - uma perspectiva histórica

Comparative Advantage in International Trade: A Historical Perspective Hardcover – March, 1999

This comprehensive book outlines the theories of trade and the interpretations of comparative advantage associated with, among others, the Mercantilists, Smith, Ricardo, Torrens, Longfield, Mill, Marshall, Pareto, Haberler, Heckscher, Ohlin and Samuelson, as well as present day trade theorists. A chapter is devoted to Hamilton, Rae and List, who interpreted comparative advantage dynamically by advocating its creation. The book breaks new ground by reinterpreting the theories of trade associated with prominent economists such as Ricardo, and drawing attention to valuable, but lesser known contributions. It considers the new trade theory from the past two decades as a legitimate successor to the dynamic views of comparative advantage of the classical economists. This book will be required reading for students and academics with an interest in the history of economic thought and international and trade economics.
Mais