Apostilas:
- Keynes e os clássicos
- Keynes e a política keynesiana
- Fórmulas básicas do modelo kaleckiano
Power Point Apresesentações
- A macroeconomia de Keynes e Kalecki
- Posições básicos do Pós-Keynesianismo
- As raízes kaleckianos da "moderna" teoria monetária
Data Shows Blanchard
- Modelo básico de Keynes
- Moeda no modelo básico de Keynes
segunda-feira, 14 de janeiro de 2013
Inflação de mais de 6 %
Economistas preveem inflação acima de 6% em 2013
Estadão Conteúdo Mais
Brasil - uma economia muita fechada
Brasil é o país com menor importação
Estadão Conteúdo
O Brasil é o país que menos importa no mundo, como proporção do seu PIB. Os dados são do Banco Mundial, e mostram como a economia brasileira é fechada, apesar das reclamações de empresários sobre a concorrência externa.
Em 2011, segundo o Banco Mundial, o Brasil teve exportações de bens e serviços equivalentes a 13% do PIB. Numa lista de 179 países, o Brasil é o que tem a menor relação entre importações e PIB. A grande maioria dos dados é de 2011, mas, no caso de alguns países, o dado é de anos anteriores (de 2007 a 2010).
No grupo dos Brics, por exemplo, a China tem importações de produtos e serviços de 27% do PIB, a Índia de 30% e a Rússia de 21%. Entre as principais economias da América Latina, o México tem importações correspondentes a 32% do PIB, a Argentina a 20% e a Colômbia a 17%. Mesmo os Estados Unidos, que são a maior e mais diversificada economia do mundo, apresentam uma proporção de importações sobre o PIB de 16%, maior do que a brasileira. As informações são do jornal O Estado de S. Paulo
Fonte
Em 2011, segundo o Banco Mundial, o Brasil teve exportações de bens e serviços equivalentes a 13% do PIB. Numa lista de 179 países, o Brasil é o que tem a menor relação entre importações e PIB. A grande maioria dos dados é de 2011, mas, no caso de alguns países, o dado é de anos anteriores (de 2007 a 2010).
No grupo dos Brics, por exemplo, a China tem importações de produtos e serviços de 27% do PIB, a Índia de 30% e a Rússia de 21%. Entre as principais economias da América Latina, o México tem importações correspondentes a 32% do PIB, a Argentina a 20% e a Colômbia a 17%. Mesmo os Estados Unidos, que são a maior e mais diversificada economia do mundo, apresentam uma proporção de importações sobre o PIB de 16%, maior do que a brasileira. As informações são do jornal O Estado de S. Paulo
Fonte
domingo, 13 de janeiro de 2013
As contribuições de Buchanan para a teoria econômica
What made Buchanan special as an economist?
Matt asks this question. I am a bit on the run, so I will do this in link-less form, but all the sources should be easily googled. Here goes:
1. He developed the “theory of clubs,” which sets out the conditions under which private associations supply excludable public goods at optimum levels.
2. For his time he had the best and most rigorous analysis of the incidence of public debt.
3. With Gordon Tullock he pioneered the economic analysis of voting rules in terms of transactions costs and external costs imposed on others. Any current blogosphere discussion of say the filibuster will rely on this approach, though we now take it so for granted we don’t realize how impressive it was at the time.
4. He had pioneering economic analyses of bicameralism, logrolling, and other aspects of legislatures, again with Tullock.
5. Along with Harsanyi, he formulated aspects of the “original position” before Rawls did and he was a major influence on Rawls. By the way, I have seen Buchanan numerous times with top professional philosophers, and he has no problem holding his own or better.
6. He helped pin down, including on the technical side, the economic concept of externality.
7. He provided the most important revision to optimal tax theory since Ramsey, namely the point that supposedly efficient methods of taxation can be too easy to use. That was in The Power to Tax, with Brennan. His piece on static vs. dynamic versions of the Laffer curve, with Dwight Lee, is also significant.
8. He provided a public choice analysis of why Keynesian economics would not lead to the appropriate budget surpluses during good times and thus would contain dangerous ratchet effects toward excess deficits.
9. He thought through the conflict between subjective and objective notions of value in economics, and the importance of methodologically individualist postulates, more deeply than perhaps any other economist. Most economists hate this work, or refuse to understand it, either because it lowers their status or because it is genuinely difficult to follow or because it requires philosophy. Yet it stands among Buchanan’s greatest contributions even if a) I do not myself agree with his approach, and b) I do not think it is easily summarized or even well-explained. Buchanan took Knight and Shackle very seriously and he understood that the typical pragmatic dismissal of their caveats was not in fact well-founded.
10. His Hayekian work on “order defined only through the process of emergence” and “economics as a science of exchange and catallactics” is a very important take-down of the scientific pretensions of much of economics. It doubted whether the notion of efficiency could be independently conceptualized at all. Again, this work is disliked or ignored. Buchanan may be going too far, but it is a very important and neglected perspective.
11. He thought more consistently in terms of “rules of the games” than perhaps any other economist. This point remains underappreciated and underapplied. It makes technocracy out to be a fundamentally different endeavor.
12. He did important work in the history of economic thought, reviving interest in the Italian school of public finance and public choice.
13. His late papers with Yoon on the work ethic, increasing returns, and economic growth remain underappreciated. I also admire his work with Yoon on the anti-commons.
There is more, but that is a start. Try his article on why pollution should be taxed for Pigouvian reasons. I could add that Buchanan understood the importance of monetary rules, and favored a regime where the supply of money would be elastic in response to negative economic circumstances.
Mais
Veja também
1. He developed the “theory of clubs,” which sets out the conditions under which private associations supply excludable public goods at optimum levels.
2. For his time he had the best and most rigorous analysis of the incidence of public debt.
3. With Gordon Tullock he pioneered the economic analysis of voting rules in terms of transactions costs and external costs imposed on others. Any current blogosphere discussion of say the filibuster will rely on this approach, though we now take it so for granted we don’t realize how impressive it was at the time.
4. He had pioneering economic analyses of bicameralism, logrolling, and other aspects of legislatures, again with Tullock.
5. Along with Harsanyi, he formulated aspects of the “original position” before Rawls did and he was a major influence on Rawls. By the way, I have seen Buchanan numerous times with top professional philosophers, and he has no problem holding his own or better.
6. He helped pin down, including on the technical side, the economic concept of externality.
7. He provided the most important revision to optimal tax theory since Ramsey, namely the point that supposedly efficient methods of taxation can be too easy to use. That was in The Power to Tax, with Brennan. His piece on static vs. dynamic versions of the Laffer curve, with Dwight Lee, is also significant.
8. He provided a public choice analysis of why Keynesian economics would not lead to the appropriate budget surpluses during good times and thus would contain dangerous ratchet effects toward excess deficits.
9. He thought through the conflict between subjective and objective notions of value in economics, and the importance of methodologically individualist postulates, more deeply than perhaps any other economist. Most economists hate this work, or refuse to understand it, either because it lowers their status or because it is genuinely difficult to follow or because it requires philosophy. Yet it stands among Buchanan’s greatest contributions even if a) I do not myself agree with his approach, and b) I do not think it is easily summarized or even well-explained. Buchanan took Knight and Shackle very seriously and he understood that the typical pragmatic dismissal of their caveats was not in fact well-founded.
10. His Hayekian work on “order defined only through the process of emergence” and “economics as a science of exchange and catallactics” is a very important take-down of the scientific pretensions of much of economics. It doubted whether the notion of efficiency could be independently conceptualized at all. Again, this work is disliked or ignored. Buchanan may be going too far, but it is a very important and neglected perspective.
11. He thought more consistently in terms of “rules of the games” than perhaps any other economist. This point remains underappreciated and underapplied. It makes technocracy out to be a fundamentally different endeavor.
12. He did important work in the history of economic thought, reviving interest in the Italian school of public finance and public choice.
13. His late papers with Yoon on the work ethic, increasing returns, and economic growth remain underappreciated. I also admire his work with Yoon on the anti-commons.
There is more, but that is a start. Try his article on why pollution should be taxed for Pigouvian reasons. I could add that Buchanan understood the importance of monetary rules, and favored a regime where the supply of money would be elastic in response to negative economic circumstances.
Mais
Veja também
Teoria Austríaca do ciclo econômico
O retorno dos anos 80
Dilma promove festa Trash na economia
po Ana Clara Costa e Naiara Infante Bertão
Com PIB baixo, deterioração fiscal, restrições a importações e dinheiro farto para bancos públicos, Presidência da República promove um revival dos anos 80 na condução da política econômica. Agora é só torcer para a inflação galopante não voltar também...... A Trash 80's é uma popular festa paulistana cujo objetivo é reviver o ambiente dos anos 1980. A similar no Rio de Janeiro é a Festa Ploc - em referência a um antigo chiclete. Com dancinhas nostálgicas e até mesmo fantasias de personagens da época, o público relembra, com espírito escrachado, uma década tida como "cafona" ou "trash" (palavra inglesa para designar aquilo que é ruim, mas tem graça). Curiosamente, em Brasília está em curso outro revival daqueles tempos de excessos. Se as festas musicais são inofensivas, a presidente Dilma Rousseff e sua equipe econômica parecem interessados em recuperar o lado perigoso dos anos 1980: o da falta de rigor no controle da inflação, das políticas econômicas de curto prazo e emergenciais, do protecionismo e do intervencionismo. O Brasil mudou - e muitas das antigas doenças econômicas foram sanadas. Mas o risco de repor em prática velhos conceitos da chamada escola desenvolvimentista, na vã esperança de que agora eles possam render frutos, continua alto.
Leia em VEJA: Intervencionismo, um jogo de risco elevado
Em 1989, o economista Roberto Campos deu uma entrevista a VEJA tratando, com a lucidez que lhe era peculiar, dos problemas que travavam o avanço do Brasil à época. Dizia Campos: “o estado se infiltra em toda a vida produtiva para atrapalhar. Criam-se obstáculos inimagináveis à importação, exigindo-se licença prévia para a compra no exterior (...) quando essa licença é uma coisa em desaparecimento no mundo”. O economista criticou o intervencionismo e o protecionismo, além de ironizar os entraves em vigor para a entrada de capital estrangeiro. “No Brasil, inventam-se ainda dificuldades enormes para a entrada do capital estrangeiro, como se estivéssemos nadando em dinheiro. Protegem-se certos setores, como a informática, da concorrência externa - e o que resulta disso é que o consumidor tem de engolir produtos de qualidade inferior e preço superior aos do mercado internacional”, disse. Apesar de ter ocorrido há mais de 20 anos, a entrevista poderia ser publicada nos dias de hoje sem que as análises de Campos soassem anacrônicas...
Mais
Em 1989, o economista Roberto Campos deu uma entrevista a VEJA tratando, com a lucidez que lhe era peculiar, dos problemas que travavam o avanço do Brasil à época. Dizia Campos: “o estado se infiltra em toda a vida produtiva para atrapalhar. Criam-se obstáculos inimagináveis à importação, exigindo-se licença prévia para a compra no exterior (...) quando essa licença é uma coisa em desaparecimento no mundo”. O economista criticou o intervencionismo e o protecionismo, além de ironizar os entraves em vigor para a entrada de capital estrangeiro. “No Brasil, inventam-se ainda dificuldades enormes para a entrada do capital estrangeiro, como se estivéssemos nadando em dinheiro. Protegem-se certos setores, como a informática, da concorrência externa - e o que resulta disso é que o consumidor tem de engolir produtos de qualidade inferior e preço superior aos do mercado internacional”, disse. Apesar de ter ocorrido há mais de 20 anos, a entrevista poderia ser publicada nos dias de hoje sem que as análises de Campos soassem anacrônicas...
Mais
Sistema monetário-bancário
"It is well enough that people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning." -- Henry Ford
sábado, 12 de janeiro de 2013
A economia da J. M. Buchanan
A Creative Theorist in His Workshop:
James M. Buchanan as a Positive Economist
William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison
1. The Samaritan=s Dilemma:
Recipients of charity can exploit the dominance feature of donors= utility payoff matrices (Buchanan
1975b).
2. Academia: If you put the faculty in charge of the university, low-opportunity cost
faculty will come to dominate university decision making, driving out the good scholars and lowering the productivity of the university; as a point of reference, one could examine the scholarly output of members of the faculty senate relative to non-member faculty in her present university (Buchanan and Devletoglou 1970).
3. Deficit Finance: If you lower the cost of taxing future citizens, they will be taxed at a greater rate (Buchanan 1958).
4. Keynesian Economics: Given a choice, politicians will vote for lower taxes and increased spending; the Keynesian Abalance wheel@ is loaded on the side of deficits; one of Keynes=s legacies is modern deficits (Buchanan 1987a).
5. Tax Collection: Governments will collect as much tax revenues as feasible, given the
constraints imposed upon them; Leviathan lives C the era of big government is not over (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
6. Political Economy: The only test of right or wrong is uncoerced agreement among participating parties; there is no one Aright@ policy independent of individuals= evaluations (Buchanan 1959).
7. Clubs: Many Apublic goods@ are produced efficiently by private, cooperative
arrangements; private supply of public goods is feasible in certain cases (Buchanan 1965a).
8. Voters: The individual=s decision to vote in the ballot box differs from market choices because of the absence of the choice-consequence nexus (Buchanan 1954).
9. Institutional Analysis: The relevant comparison is between realized and not idealized
institutional alternatives; government is not a free lunch (Buchanan 1962a).
10. Fiscal Federalism: Fiscal mobility of individuals and capital embodies certain potential social costs; Acities@ do not function like private clubs because certain property rights are undefined (Buchanan and Goetz 1972).
11. Expressive Voting: Voters may be more virtuous in a 1/N setting by virtue of the first law of demand (Brennan and Buchanan 1984).
12. Ricardian Equivalence: Uncertainty over future tax liabilities leads people to prefer debt to
taxes (Buchanan 1976a).
13. Work Ethic: Individuals have an economic self-interest in the ethics of others; the work ethic (as well as a saving ethic) promotes generalized increasing returns (Buchanan 1994a).
14. Public Choice: Man does not alter his basic behavior as between market and non- market settings; only the constraints are different (Buchanan 1979a).
15. Monetary Policy: Monetary rules and greater predictability of monetary policy are associated with a more prosperous economy (Buchanan 1962b).
16. Government Failure: Government is not a perfect instrument for correcting market
failures (Buchanan 1962a).
17. Rent Seeking: The pursuit of transfers takes place in both public and private settings
(e.g., the rat race); primogeniture will reduce rent seeking in families (Buchanan 1983).
18. Reform: We start from where we are (Buchanan 1962a).
19. Anarchy: The study of a world without government teaches us about the rational basis for steps to civil society and the consequences of a breakdown in social order (Buchanan 1972).
20. Tax Reform: AReform@ begats reform, as the tax code is auctioned off every so many years; rent seeking is a dynamic game (Buchanan 1987b).
21. Ethical Norms: Many ethical norms are the result of a long ago cost-benefit calculus suggesting the gains from trade from ethical behavior; ethics have economic value; ethics are a relatively absolute absolute (Buchanan 1965b).
22. Justice: Justice is fairness (Buchanan 1976b).
23. Secession: The ability to opt out produces fiscal benefits in a federal system; if at first you do not secede, try, try again (Buchanan and Faith 1987).
24. Monopoly: In some cases (crime, for instance) monopoly (e.g., the Mafia) produces social benefits (in a second-best sense) (Buchanan 1973).
25. Literature: The autobiographies of scientists are more truthful than those of novelists (Buchanan and Tollison 1986).
26. Economists: There are examples of Anatural@ economists, for example, Gordon Tullock (Buchanan 1987a).
27. Environmental Regulation: Interest groups prefer command and control regulation to emission fees, tradable pollution permits, and taxes (Buchanan and Tullock 1975).
28. Tax Earmarking: Tax earmarking produces fiscal outcomes superior to general fund
budgeting; why should we buy public goods in fixed bundles (Buchanan 1963)?
29. Indirect Taxation: In a multiple period model of individual choice, there are
conditions under which indirect is preferred to direct taxation (Buchanan 1966).
30. Generality Constraints: In majoritarian democracy, general rules that apply to all citizens inhibit majority cycling and rent seeking (Buchanan and Congleton 1998).
31. In-Kind Redistribution: There is an individualistic rationale for redistributing specific
goods and services rather than general purchasing power (Buchanan 1968b).
32. Public Goods: The demand for public goods has a negative slope (Buchanan 1966).
33. Social Security: Employers do not Apay@ the payroll tax (Buchanan 1990).
34. Fiscal Illusion: Politicians have an incentive to obscure the costs of government programs and to highlight the benefits of the same programs (Buchanan 1966).
35. Fiscal Awareness: Individuals are not very aware of how much they pay in taxes (Buchanan 1966).
36. Ethics and Economics: Ethical behavior is muted by individual incentives in a large numbers setting; ethical behavior is subject to the first law of demand (Buchanan 1965b).
37. Majority Rule: Though widely used, this voting procedure does not have much to recommend it; combined, for example, with geographic representation, it leads to inefficient public policies (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
38. Relative Unanimity: More inclusive voting rules increase collective decision costs but enhance the efficiency of collective decisions (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
39. Unanimity: Unanimous agreement is the only voting rule consistent with discerning underlying increases in economic welfare (Buchanan 1962a).
40. Logrolling: Vote trading is analogous to private exchange in some respects in that it can enhance the productivity and stability of collective decision making under specified circumstances (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
41. Constitutional Economics: The rules for in-period political exchange are a key source of the capital stock of any society; societies with better rules are more productive (Buchanan 1986).
42. Public Goods: In a small numbers setting, public goods will be provided efficiently on a voluntary exchange basis among individuals; in a large numbers setting individuals will pursue the potential gains from trade by selecting rules and institutions for the provision of public goods (Buchanan 1968a).
43. Profit Seeking: Profit seeking in competitive markets is not analogous to rent seeking; profit seeking creates value; rent seeking destroys value (Buchanan 1980).
44. Entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurs have positive and negative effects depending upon the institutional setting in which entrepreneurship is practiced (profit seeking versus rent seeking) (Buchanan 1980).
45. Socialism: An economic system which separates consumption from production will not survive (Buchanan 1997).
46. Democracy: This word must be preceded by Aconstitutional@ if political equality is to be meaningful; democracy is not majoritorianism or mob rule (Buchanan 1997).
47. Bureaucracy: Bureaucracy is a system of political pricing that makes decisions based on criteria other than economic value (Buchanan 1994b).
48. Exit: The absence of an exit option in political processes blocks an important feedback loop to public decision makers (Buchanan and Faith 1987).
49. Science: Politics, unlike science, is not a search for truth; politics is about agreement (Buchanan 1967).
50. Market Orders: Outcomes emerge in ordinary markets from the process of individual choice; the end-state or allocative result has no meaning independent of individual choices (Buchanan 1982).
51. Valuation of Government Goods: If goods are given away freely, individuals will dissipate their value by over-usage (Buchanan 1968a).
52. Quantity Discounts: Monopolists secure more profit by introducing discounts on large purchases (Buchanan 1952-53).
53. Endogeneous Alternatives for Voting Choices: The alternatives presented for collective voting choices jointly depend on the voting rule (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
54. Heterogeneous Inputs: In the presence of heterogeneous inputs a competitive input purchaser will behave like a perfectly discriminating monopsonist in purchasing bundles of heterogeneous inputs (Buchanan and Tollison 1981).
55. Relatively Absolute Absolutes: Something must be taken as given for purposes of analysis; there is a choice among choices and then choice itself (Buchanan 1989).
56. Economics: Economics is not about allocating scarce resources; it is about choice; it is also better than plowing (Buchanan 1979b).
57. The Welfare State: If the recipients of income transfers are allowed to participate in the collective decision concerning the size of the transfer, self-interested voting will bias transfers upward (Buchanan 1975a).
58. Public Finance: Fiscal policy outcomes can only be understood in the context of the budget as a whole; taxing and spending policies both have distributional consequences (Buchanan 1949).
59. Judges: Good law is the enforcement of agreed upon rules; social justice and law and economics are both about mutual consent (Buchanan 1974).
Mais
James M. Buchanan as a Positive Economist
William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison
2. Academia: If you put the faculty in charge of the university, low-opportunity cost
faculty will come to dominate university decision making, driving out the good scholars and lowering the productivity of the university; as a point of reference, one could examine the scholarly output of members of the faculty senate relative to non-member faculty in her present university (Buchanan and Devletoglou 1970).
3. Deficit Finance: If you lower the cost of taxing future citizens, they will be taxed at a greater rate (Buchanan 1958).
4. Keynesian Economics: Given a choice, politicians will vote for lower taxes and increased spending; the Keynesian Abalance wheel@ is loaded on the side of deficits; one of Keynes=s legacies is modern deficits (Buchanan 1987a).
5. Tax Collection: Governments will collect as much tax revenues as feasible, given the
constraints imposed upon them; Leviathan lives C the era of big government is not over (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
6. Political Economy: The only test of right or wrong is uncoerced agreement among participating parties; there is no one Aright@ policy independent of individuals= evaluations (Buchanan 1959).
7. Clubs: Many Apublic goods@ are produced efficiently by private, cooperative
arrangements; private supply of public goods is feasible in certain cases (Buchanan 1965a).
8. Voters: The individual=s decision to vote in the ballot box differs from market choices because of the absence of the choice-consequence nexus (Buchanan 1954).
9. Institutional Analysis: The relevant comparison is between realized and not idealized
institutional alternatives; government is not a free lunch (Buchanan 1962a).
10. Fiscal Federalism: Fiscal mobility of individuals and capital embodies certain potential social costs; Acities@ do not function like private clubs because certain property rights are undefined (Buchanan and Goetz 1972).
11. Expressive Voting: Voters may be more virtuous in a 1/N setting by virtue of the first law of demand (Brennan and Buchanan 1984).
12. Ricardian Equivalence: Uncertainty over future tax liabilities leads people to prefer debt to
taxes (Buchanan 1976a).
13. Work Ethic: Individuals have an economic self-interest in the ethics of others; the work ethic (as well as a saving ethic) promotes generalized increasing returns (Buchanan 1994a).
14. Public Choice: Man does not alter his basic behavior as between market and non- market settings; only the constraints are different (Buchanan 1979a).
15. Monetary Policy: Monetary rules and greater predictability of monetary policy are associated with a more prosperous economy (Buchanan 1962b).
16. Government Failure: Government is not a perfect instrument for correcting market
failures (Buchanan 1962a).
17. Rent Seeking: The pursuit of transfers takes place in both public and private settings
(e.g., the rat race); primogeniture will reduce rent seeking in families (Buchanan 1983).
18. Reform: We start from where we are (Buchanan 1962a).
19. Anarchy: The study of a world without government teaches us about the rational basis for steps to civil society and the consequences of a breakdown in social order (Buchanan 1972).
20. Tax Reform: AReform@ begats reform, as the tax code is auctioned off every so many years; rent seeking is a dynamic game (Buchanan 1987b).
21. Ethical Norms: Many ethical norms are the result of a long ago cost-benefit calculus suggesting the gains from trade from ethical behavior; ethics have economic value; ethics are a relatively absolute absolute (Buchanan 1965b).
22. Justice: Justice is fairness (Buchanan 1976b).
23. Secession: The ability to opt out produces fiscal benefits in a federal system; if at first you do not secede, try, try again (Buchanan and Faith 1987).
24. Monopoly: In some cases (crime, for instance) monopoly (e.g., the Mafia) produces social benefits (in a second-best sense) (Buchanan 1973).
25. Literature: The autobiographies of scientists are more truthful than those of novelists (Buchanan and Tollison 1986).
26. Economists: There are examples of Anatural@ economists, for example, Gordon Tullock (Buchanan 1987a).
27. Environmental Regulation: Interest groups prefer command and control regulation to emission fees, tradable pollution permits, and taxes (Buchanan and Tullock 1975).
28. Tax Earmarking: Tax earmarking produces fiscal outcomes superior to general fund
budgeting; why should we buy public goods in fixed bundles (Buchanan 1963)?
29. Indirect Taxation: In a multiple period model of individual choice, there are
conditions under which indirect is preferred to direct taxation (Buchanan 1966).
30. Generality Constraints: In majoritarian democracy, general rules that apply to all citizens inhibit majority cycling and rent seeking (Buchanan and Congleton 1998).
31. In-Kind Redistribution: There is an individualistic rationale for redistributing specific
goods and services rather than general purchasing power (Buchanan 1968b).
32. Public Goods: The demand for public goods has a negative slope (Buchanan 1966).
33. Social Security: Employers do not Apay@ the payroll tax (Buchanan 1990).
34. Fiscal Illusion: Politicians have an incentive to obscure the costs of government programs and to highlight the benefits of the same programs (Buchanan 1966).
35. Fiscal Awareness: Individuals are not very aware of how much they pay in taxes (Buchanan 1966).
36. Ethics and Economics: Ethical behavior is muted by individual incentives in a large numbers setting; ethical behavior is subject to the first law of demand (Buchanan 1965b).
37. Majority Rule: Though widely used, this voting procedure does not have much to recommend it; combined, for example, with geographic representation, it leads to inefficient public policies (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
38. Relative Unanimity: More inclusive voting rules increase collective decision costs but enhance the efficiency of collective decisions (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
39. Unanimity: Unanimous agreement is the only voting rule consistent with discerning underlying increases in economic welfare (Buchanan 1962a).
40. Logrolling: Vote trading is analogous to private exchange in some respects in that it can enhance the productivity and stability of collective decision making under specified circumstances (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
41. Constitutional Economics: The rules for in-period political exchange are a key source of the capital stock of any society; societies with better rules are more productive (Buchanan 1986).
42. Public Goods: In a small numbers setting, public goods will be provided efficiently on a voluntary exchange basis among individuals; in a large numbers setting individuals will pursue the potential gains from trade by selecting rules and institutions for the provision of public goods (Buchanan 1968a).
43. Profit Seeking: Profit seeking in competitive markets is not analogous to rent seeking; profit seeking creates value; rent seeking destroys value (Buchanan 1980).
44. Entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurs have positive and negative effects depending upon the institutional setting in which entrepreneurship is practiced (profit seeking versus rent seeking) (Buchanan 1980).
45. Socialism: An economic system which separates consumption from production will not survive (Buchanan 1997).
46. Democracy: This word must be preceded by Aconstitutional@ if political equality is to be meaningful; democracy is not majoritorianism or mob rule (Buchanan 1997).
47. Bureaucracy: Bureaucracy is a system of political pricing that makes decisions based on criteria other than economic value (Buchanan 1994b).
48. Exit: The absence of an exit option in political processes blocks an important feedback loop to public decision makers (Buchanan and Faith 1987).
49. Science: Politics, unlike science, is not a search for truth; politics is about agreement (Buchanan 1967).
50. Market Orders: Outcomes emerge in ordinary markets from the process of individual choice; the end-state or allocative result has no meaning independent of individual choices (Buchanan 1982).
51. Valuation of Government Goods: If goods are given away freely, individuals will dissipate their value by over-usage (Buchanan 1968a).
52. Quantity Discounts: Monopolists secure more profit by introducing discounts on large purchases (Buchanan 1952-53).
53. Endogeneous Alternatives for Voting Choices: The alternatives presented for collective voting choices jointly depend on the voting rule (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
54. Heterogeneous Inputs: In the presence of heterogeneous inputs a competitive input purchaser will behave like a perfectly discriminating monopsonist in purchasing bundles of heterogeneous inputs (Buchanan and Tollison 1981).
55. Relatively Absolute Absolutes: Something must be taken as given for purposes of analysis; there is a choice among choices and then choice itself (Buchanan 1989).
56. Economics: Economics is not about allocating scarce resources; it is about choice; it is also better than plowing (Buchanan 1979b).
57. The Welfare State: If the recipients of income transfers are allowed to participate in the collective decision concerning the size of the transfer, self-interested voting will bias transfers upward (Buchanan 1975a).
58. Public Finance: Fiscal policy outcomes can only be understood in the context of the budget as a whole; taxing and spending policies both have distributional consequences (Buchanan 1949).
59. Judges: Good law is the enforcement of agreed upon rules; social justice and law and economics are both about mutual consent (Buchanan 1974).
Mais
As raízes hispânicas da teoria econômica moderna
Four Hundred Years of Dynamic Efficiency
I will divide my presentation into three parts. First, I will speak about the Spanish roots of Austrian economics; second, I will introduce, following the Austrian tradition, a dynamic concept of economic efficiency; and third, I will try to demonstrate the intimate relationship that exists between ethics and efficiency in the capitalist system.Leia mais
A 4.a proposição fundamental de J.S. Mill
OCCASIONAL PAPER #10: O PAPEL DA QUARTA PROPOSIÇÃO FUNDAMENTAL DE J. S. MILL NA TEORIA AUSTRÍACA DOS CICLOS ECONÔMICOSUbiratan A Quarta Proposição Fundamental de John Stuart Mill (1806-1876), formulada em 1848, no Livro I, capítulo V, dos Principles, na forma de um aforismo ("demanda de mercadorias não é demanda de mão de obra"), é um dos elementos decisivos para distinguir a “macroeconomia” dos austríacos e particularmente a de Hayek da macroeconomia da mainstream economics. Em todos os modelos macroeconômicos modernos, de tintas keynesianas ou não, os níveis de gastos de consumo e de investimento movem-se no mesmo sentido. Nesta famosa proposição, contudo, Mill sugere que a demanda de bens de consumo e a demanda de investimentos podem mover-se em sentidos opostos. Tentaremos mostrar como é lamentável que Keynes, noventa anos depois, demonstrasse não ter compreendido sua essência e enveredado pelo caminho dos “agregados macroeconômicos”, no que foi seguido, infelizmente, pelos monetaristas. Tal negligência acabou influenciando de modo absolutamente negativo praticamente toda a macroeconomia ensinada nas universidades e – o que é pior – as práticas dos governos de todo o mundo, desde os anos 30 do século XX.
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sexta-feira, 11 de janeiro de 2013
Investimentos públicos
O ritmo de expansão é o menor desde 2006, mostra levantamento da ONG Contas Abertas; governo investiu apenas 40% dos R$ 114,6 bilhões previstos para 2012; sem plano estratégico, país pode repetir o pibinho neste ano
Levantamento da ONG Contas Abertas divulgado nesta sexta-feira mostra que a União investiu 46,9 bilhões de reais no exercício de 2012. O valor é apenas 5% superior ao gasto com investimentos em 2011, quando 44,4 bilhões de reais foram aplicados, levando em conta valores constantes - atualizados pelo Índice Geral de Preços - Disponibilidade Interna (IGP-DI), da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV).
A despeito do crescimento, o valor investido pelo governo representou apenas 40% dos 114,6 bilhões de reais previstos para 2012. Desse montante, 25,3 bilhões de reais foram de restos a pagar, ou seja, de compromissos assumidos em anos anteriores mas não quitados nos respectivos exercícios.
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Poder = controle do dinheiro
quinta-feira, 10 de janeiro de 2013
As contribuições de James Buchanan para a teoria econômica
Buchanan’s work changed political economy in fundamental ways. Thanks to him and his colleagues, three things are true: No one who wishes to talk responsibly about politics can be ignorant of public choice theory. No one should ever invoke the language of market failure (including externalities) without having digested his work on government failure. And people who run around talking about the constitution better be able to understand something of his contributions to constitutional political economy.
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quarta-feira, 9 de janeiro de 2013
James M. Buchanan - RIP
Im memoriam do James Buchanan (1919-2013)
Custo e escolha: Uma indagação em teoria econômica
Cost and Choice. An Inquiry into Economic Theory
Custo e escolha: Uma indagação em teoria econômica
Cost and Choice. An Inquiry into Economic Theory
Falências de empresas aumentam
Pedidos de falência sobem 11% em 2012, mostra Serasa
Estadão Conteúdo –
O número de pedidos de falência de empresas em todo o País subiu de 136 em novembro para 139 em dezembro. Com isso, o total de requerimentos em 2012 chegou a 1.929, alta de 11% na comparação com os 1.737 pedidos de 2011, informou nesta quarta-feira a Serasa Experian. De acordo com o Indicador de Falências e Recuperações, dos 1.929 pedidos, 1.086 envolveram micro e pequenas empresas, 530 médias e 313 empresas de grande porte.
Para os economistas da Serasa Experian, as empresas enfrentaram um ambiente desfavorável para a geração de receitas e gestão do fluxo de caixa em 2012.
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Crescimento econômico sem milagres
Para os economistas da Serasa Experian, as empresas enfrentaram um ambiente desfavorável para a geração de receitas e gestão do fluxo de caixa em 2012.
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Crescimento econômico sem milagres
Brasil - produção industrial
Produção industrial cai em 6 de 14 regiões em novembro
Estadão Conteúdo –
A produção industrial brasileira recuou, no mês de novembro em relação a outubro, em seis dos 14 locais pesquisados pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). As quedas mais acentuadas foram registradas em Goiás (-14,7%), no Espírito Santo (-6,3%), Pará (-6,0%) e Paraná (-5,1%), após todos terem registrado resultados positivos em outubro: de 16,5%, 13,4%, 4,5% e 2,8%, respectivamente. Houve perdas ainda em São Paulo (-1,9%) e Minas Gerais (-0,7%). No total nacional, a queda foi menos intensa, de -0,6%.
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terça-feira, 8 de janeiro de 2013
Subsídios do governo
Prostitutas de BH têm aulas grátis de inglês para se preparar para a Copa
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LUIZA BANDEIRA
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http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/1211528-prostitutas-de-bh-tem-aulas-gratis-de-ingles-para-se-preparar-para-a-copa.shtml
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